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In 1982, Professors Bruce Ackerman and Donald Elliot wrote
an op-ed in the New York Times comparing the creation of emis-
sion reduction credits to the Sooner land rush of 1889.1 They ar-
gued that just as the homesteading represented a federal give
away of millions of dollars of a publicly owned resource, the distri-
bution, for free, of emission reduction credits was a similar give
away. This time, though, they argued it was even less justified.
The public giveaway of emission reduction credits was not done to
spread resources more widely, but to achieve pollution reduction
at a higher cost to the public than was justified. The cost, accord-
ing to Professors Ackerman and Elliot was the give away of the
public interest in the air resource. As they put it:
[Tihe cost savings of a market-based program can be obtained
without the give-away contemplated by the Administration.
The E.P.A. should, instead, sell polluters the right to dirty the
air for a fixed period -just as the Government now auctions off
oil and gas leases to the highest bidders. If polluters were forced
to pay, they would clean up to avoid the cost - and breathers, not
industry, would profit. The public would not stand for a mul-
tibillion dollar give-away of public lands or water to industry.
Why should the air be different?2
Why, indeed. In much of the discussion surrounding the re-
form of the command and control systems for reducing conven-
tional air pollutants, as well as the debate culminating in the
Kyoto agreement for the reduction of greenhouse gasses, the air
resource has been treated as though it were completely within the
domain of the government and large corporations to apportion.
Yet, as Ackerman and Elliot point out, there is a class of benefi-
ciaries who are central to the debate and to the calculation of cost.
These would be the "breathers" identified by Ackerman and Elliot
as the real parties in interest. Yet, what is their, or rather our,
interest? The answer turns on whether there are constraints on
how the government deals with the air resource. Once it is capable
of being commodified, are the normal workings of the market, per-
1. Bruce A. Ackerman & Donald Elliot, Air Pollution 'Rights,' N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
11, 1982, at 23.
2. Id.
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haps modulated by express requirements of fair dealing (if not
transparency), the only way to assess plans for the distribution of
the resource? What if there are additional sources of public inter-
est that must be accommodated? What if the resource is not the
government's to give away? We have all assumed that the air re-
source, that is its natural quality and its carbon and pollution
loading capacity, once the private rights of action had been largely
overtaken by an elaborate regulatory regime, is the government's
to do with as it sees fit.
What I argue here is that the general assumptions concerning
the air resource are largely mistaken. Moreover, I want to suggest
a different way of analyzing just what the appropriate characteri-
zation of the air resource ought to be. I argue that the public has
an ownership interest, or its equivalent, in the air resource. This,
of course, assumes that there still exists a class of unassigned nat-
ural resources subject to distribution rules that protect the inter-
ests of those who might have a claim in the resource. It also
assumes that there is a principle of equality that guides the claim
to distribution of the resource. Finally, I also suggest that the
treatment of the air resource consistent with the insights captured
by Ackerman and Elliot will also result in a more equitable and
efficient pollution reduction and greenhouse gas reduction regime.
Moreover, by increasing the centrality of the public interest in the
management of the air resource we make the regulatory regime
more democratic. Within the international regime, extension of
the interest of the public in the air resource raises the stakes in
improving the democratic content of state-to-state negotiations
that are at the heart of international environmental regimes.
The central question addressed in this essay is who owns cur-
rently unassigned natural resources. Most people believe that the
answer to the question of ownership of the natural resources in
this country (and in the world, for that matter) has largely been
resolved. For the most part, natural resources have both been re-
duced to private ownership and made subject to the ordinary
workings of the market, or they have been reserved for state own-
ership through either the national or state governments. 3 Those
options do not exhaust the possible forms of ownership.
3. In fact, the resurrection of the "equal footing" doctrine has put state owner-
ship of various natural resources into conflict with the claims of Indian tribes and
through them the Federal government as trustee for the tribes. The recent case of
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians has raised additional questions
about the equal footing doctrine and its relationship to control of natural resources,
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In fact, there are those resources that are controlled by the
state through regulation that ought to be thought of as public
property in a different sense. Rather than assuming that public
ownership means ownership by the state, ask instead whether it
ought to mean ownership by the people in a real sense. Not in the
metaphorical sense that government ownership means ownership
by the polity (which is the way "the people" is conventionally un-
derstood). Real ownership in this sense would mean a form of com-
mon ownership. This is not a novel suggestion. The Roman law
doctrine of res communes recognized that "some forms of property
are legally incapable of exclusive ownership. Instead the common-
ality-the people collectively-owns them. Such ownership differs
from state sovereignty and state ownership in fee, although the
state often holds the title in trust for the beneficial interests of the
people."4
In a democratic polity, the reservation of resources for the
state (aside from those owned in fee by the government in further-
ance of its governmental duties) ought to mean a reservation of
the resources on behalf of the people. 5 For those resources that
are subject to common ownership this is doubly true. In both
cases, the management of the resources is governed historically by
principles of trust law.6 The United States, through its various
but it promises to be source of continuing conflict. See generally 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
In many ways, this conflict is a result of the reinvigoration of the federalist claims
within our governing structure and first had popular resonance with the so-called
"sage-brush rebellion" in the 1970s. Of course, it is a also a variant of the states'
rights claims that trace back to the civil war, and most recently, the civil rights
movement.
4. Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses from and Old Manse:Another Look at Some His-
toric Property Cases about the Environment, 64 CoRNELL L. REv. 761, 799-801 (1979)
(internal footnote omitted). In the omitted footnote Dean Coquillette makes it clear
that the commonality or the commune meant "the people of the whole realm" and not
the King or the Parliament.
5. As Richard Epstein puts it:
The questions to be asked, therefore are two: What rules will in general
promote voluntary transactions? And what methods does the legal system
have to "correct" those original allocations that turn out to be arguably
wrong? The first of these questions addresses the mix of public and pri-
vate property. The second addresses the role of the eminent domain prin-
ciple and its analogue for public property, the public trust doctrine. The
eminent domain rules govern the forced conversion of private to public
property. Rightly understood, the public trust rules do the reverse, and
govern the forced conversion of public to private property.
Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 414 (1987).
6. Even recognizing a trust responsibility on the part of the government does not
guarantee that the government will act responsibly. Take, for example, the recent
case of Cobell v. Babbitt, where the district court held the Secretaries of the Interior
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federal departments, manages resources that remain within the
public domain for the public benefit as defined by the Congress
under the property clause of the Constitution. 7 Defining the public
interest is a fundamentally political process that is bounded by
principles against self-dealing." This ethical prohibition is not the
only limitation, however. There are principles arising from trust
theory and from the theory of common ownership that suggest
substantive limitations on the way the government deals with
those assets. 9 I will discuss the public trust doctrine more exten-
sively later in this essay. However, suffice here to say that the
notion of external limiting obligations on state treatment of com-
mon property arises specifically because the property is deemed
not to belong to the state, but to the people for whom the state is
beneficially managing the asset.
and the Treasury, as well as the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, in contempt of
court for failure to produce documents relating to an alleged four billion dollars in
mis-managed trust assets. See 37 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 1999). In Cobell, the assets
belonged to individual tribal members to whom the federal government owes a clearly
established trust responsibility. This decision was recently affirmed in the D.C. Cir-
cuit in Cobell v. Norton, holding that the DOI breached its fiduciary duties to trust
account beneficiaries and, therefore, must conduct an accurate accounting. See 240
F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 returned to tribal
ownership unallotted lands. The federal government retained fiduciary obligations to
administer trusts and funds arising from allotted, but not yet fee-patented lands, for
the benefit of individual Native American beneficiaries.
7. The Constitution declares in article 4, section 3, that "Congress shall have
power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the terri-
tory or other property belonging to the United States." U.S. CONST. art 4, § 3.
8. Of course, modern public choice theory suggests that rent seeking by govern-
ment decision-makers is what drives policy. See, e.g., J. Buchanon, Rent Seeking and
Profit Seeking, in J. BUCHANON ET AL., TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT SEEKING SOCI-
ETY. For a contrary view, or at least a sustained methodological criticism, see DONALD
GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, THE PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF
APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1994). For a good introduction of its use in law,
see PHILIP P. FRICKEY & DANIEL A FARBER, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL IN-
TRODUCTION (1991). Of course, there are also constitutional limitations on the exercise
of the legislative power.
9. One of the persistent debates within Federal Indian Law is whether the ple-
nary power that Congress has used to regulate Indian affairs is limited by any exter-
nal principle. The answer has typically been "no." Similarly, the plenary regulatory
power that is given over to the Congress by the property clause would also appear to
be unbounded by any external principle. It is not obvious that this is so. To the extent
that there is a correlative trust obligation in both contexts, it makes little sense to
suggest that the trustee is free to determine what its duties are. Such a conclusion
would suggest that the trust responsibility is whatever Congress says it is. However,
if a claim is advanced for the existence of an external limiting principle the obligation
is to identify both the rough content and the source of that obligation. That, in es-
sence, is the task of this essay.
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In 1892, in one of its most famous cases, Illinois Central Rail-
road v. Illinois,1° the Supreme Court made it abundantly clear
that the category of common public property was not a mere arti-
fact of Roman law, but a vital part of existing American jurispru-
dence." That case involved the transfer in fee of submerged land
beneath Lake Michigan to the Illinois Central Railroad and the
subsequent revocation of the transfer. If the initial transfer was
valid, the revocation of the transfer could not be done without
compensating the railroad for its loss. If, however, the initial
transfer was invalid, then there would be no loss. Justice Field
held that although the state held title to the land, it held it "in
trust for the people of the State."1 2 He went on the argue that the
"State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the
whole people are interested... than it can abdicate its police pow-
ers."' 3 Thus the initial grant was void (or at minimum, voidable).
The argument that the court accepted explicitly adopted a concep-
tion of res comunes.14
10. See generally 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
11. Professor Gregory S. Alexander argues that the public trust doctrine is part of
the ongoing doctrinal debate within property law over the correct description of the
various roles that property law plays in constituting the legal and more general cul-
ture. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970 270-276 (1997).
Since the reinvigoration of the public trust doctrine, there has been considerable
debate on the property basis of the doctrine. Some have argued that the "trust" lan-
guage is really just a way of talking about the civil obligations of the state and should
not be understood as referring to the body of law contained within conventional trust
categories. I deal with this issue later on in the text. But as I suggest here, to separate
the trust language from its property mooring requires that it be tethered elsewhere.
Some have suggested that it is an emergent principle in administrative law others
have argued that it is a basis for judicial review of both administrative as well as
legislative actions. In all events, it must still have substantive parameters to be use-
ful even in this limited way.
12. Illinois Central Railroad, 146 U.S. at 452.
13. Id. at 453. The Court had previously held that an attempt by the state to
divest itself of its police power to be unconstitutional. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101
U.S. 814 (1879). "All agree that the legislature cannot bargain away the police power
of a State." Id. at 817.
14. John S. Miller, Counsel for the City of Chicago, argued:
The bed of Lake Michigan so far as the same is not affected with rights of
the riparian owner, is held by the people of the State of Illinois in their
sovereign capacity and de comuni jure, and wholly in trust for the pub-
lic[.] And the same was not held by the State in any proprietary or private
right or as its demesne ....
Id. at 421 (emphasis added). As amplified by Shively v. Bowlby:
Lands under tide waters are incapable of cultivation or improvement in
the manner of lands above high-water mark. They are of great value to
the public for the purposes of commerce, navigation, and fishery. Their
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Similarly, the California Supreme Court affirmed this notion
of public property in the case of Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. All
Parties and Persons.15 There the court noted that:
[Tihe state is not the owner of the domestic water of the
state in the sense that it has absolute power and dominion over
it to the exclusion of the rights of those who have the beneficial
interests therein. The title is an equitable one residing in the
water users of the state. The state as an entity is the holder of
the legal title as trustee for the benefit of the people of the state,
all of whom in the last analysis, are the water users of the
state. 16
What is important about these two cases (and they are but two in
a tidal wave of public trust cases)17 is that they quite clearly set
out the property law foundations for the public interest in the re-
source decisions being made by the state. These are not cases
about the regularity of the administrative process. Instead, they
improvement by individuals, when permitted, is incidental or subordinate
to the public use and right. Therefore, the title and the control of them are
vested in the sovereign, for the benefit of the whole people.
152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894).
15. See generally 306 P.2d 824 (Cal. 1957), rev'd sub nom., Ivanhoe Irrigation Dis-
trict v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958). The reversal did not implicate the California
Supreme Court's reliance on common public ownership.
16. 306 P.2d at 840. The court noted:
The exclusion of the question of title from the case could be justified only
on the theory that without question, and as a matter of law, the fee sim-
ple unrestricted title to the water is in the state or in its assignee, the
United States, or in the United States other than by assignment unaf-
fected by the claims of the land owners in the District as the beneficiaries
of a trust. Such a theory finds no support in the present case. A trust
relationship has existed at all times here involved, and now exists, be-
tween the State of California and the water users of the state, including
the water users of the plaintiff District, as to all waters the control of
which has been acquired by the state by appropriation or purchase.
Id. at 837. For someone who is concerned about the environment, this case is prob-
lematic as a matter of policy. The essence of the case was an attempt by the Depart-
ment of the Interior to enforce the 160-acre limitation under the Reclamation Act.
17. Since the publication of Professor Joe Sax's seminal article on the public trust
doctrine and its application to natural resources, there have been well over a hundred
cases in over half of the states invoking the public trust doctrine. See Joseph L. Sax,
The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,
68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) [hereinafter Sax, Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Re-
source Law). See also Richard Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sover-
eignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV.
631, 644-45, n.77 (1986) (where he collects the cases that have arisen between 1970
and 1985). See also Lynda L. Butler, The Commons Concept: An Historical Concept
with Modern Relevance, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 835, 840 (1982).
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are cases that go to the heart of the subject matter of the adminis-
trative or legislative process involving resource use and allocation:
who owns the property that is being regulated or allocated and
what are the attendant duties on the state regarding those proper-
ties? As summarized by Professor Epstein:
Two questions have to be addressed. The first is whether the
transfer should have been made, and the second is, when made,
what level of compensation should be provided? The problem of
disposing of public property thus raises the mirror image of pub-
lic use and just compensation questions under the takings
clause of the Fifth Amendment .... "No public property may be
transferred to private use, without just compensation," payable
to the public at large.18
While the argument advanced here might apply to every pub-
licly owned natural resource, it is not necessary to go that far all
at once. In fact, to do so would risk unsettling a variety of arrange-
ments upon which people have organized their lives and their en-
terprises. Yet prudence is not principle, although it may inform it.
There are many resource issues that the government must still
resolve, all of which squarely ask the question of governmental
obligation. Professor Butler suggests that the fundamental ques-
tions are: (1) whether a particular public use of a resource should
be protected as superior to conflicting private uses and if so, (2) do
private uses substantially impair the public interest, (3) finally, if
the private use is a substantial impairment of the public interest
is it justified through legislative action undertaken for another su-
perior public purpose. 19 Outside of the radio spectrum, the most
pressing question is: Who Owns the Sky?
I. Clean Air as a Common Asset
The atmosphere has not, historically, been thought of as a
natural resource that was subject to private ownership. In many
ways it was not even thought of as a natural resource. It merely
was, as the saying goes, there. Instead, it was presumed to be one
of those resources that could not be owned. It was conceived to be
like the oceans - too large and unbounded to be reducible to the
18. Epstein, supra note 5, at 419 (emphasis in the original).
19. See Butler, supra note 17, at 908, 922. My formulation paraphrases her
description of both the historical and modem tests.
[Vol. 18
2001] WHO OWNS THE SKY? 235
kind of exclusive possession that characterizes private property. 20
To be sure, the water resources of the earth were subject to state
claims and various regimes emerged for the allocation of the fresh
water resource to private parties. But even the private property
regimes continued to reflect a public interest that was not dis-
claimable. That is the lesson from both the Ivanhoe and the Illi-
nois Central cases. 21 Yet the air was different. It could be used
but not controlled. Its common law regulation was essentially a
subspecies of the law related to real property, since without a
claim to damages tied to real property, historically, there was no
claim at all.22 Because it could not be reduced to exclusive posses-
sion, it was generally categorized within that class of assets that
were invested with a public character. To the extent that there
was a property interest in the sky, it was as res communes.
Of course, the emissions trading schemes that emerged with
the Clean Air Act, including the cumulating schemes like the
EPA's bubble policy, created concrete measurable interests in the
sky and the permits themselves are treated (at least by those
outside of government) as a form of highly regulated property.23
20. See 2 HuGo GROTIUS, DE JuRE BELLI Ac PAcis 187, 190 (Francis Kelsey trans.,
1925) (1625).
Some things belong to us by a right common to mankind, others by our
individual right.. .Having laid down these fundamental principles, we
say that the sea, viewed either as a whole or in its principle divisions,
cannot become subject to private ownership.. .The extent of the ocean is
in fact so great that it suffices for any possible use on the part of all the
peoples.. .The same thing would need to be said, too, about the air....
Id.
21. See generally Ivanhoe, 357 U.S. 275; Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387.
22. The law of nuisance and trespass were the common law forms that guided
land usage. The air was thought of a kind of commons, and the law of nuisance and
the law of trespass were the rules that policed the usage of the commons. This over-
looks, of course, the damage that landowners might inflict on non-landowners. The
law of nuisance, in response to some of the problems, was further subdivided into that
of public and private nuisances. For a good discussion of the difference, see WILLIAM
H. RODGERS, ENVTL. LAW (2d ed. 1994) (specifically, Chapter 2: Common Law and the
Variations).
23. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(f) (1994) (for the proposition they are not
property):
Nature of allowances. An allowance allocated under this subchapter is a
limited authorization to emit sulfur dioxide in accordance with the provi-
sions of this subchapter. Such allowance does not constitute a property
right. Nothing in this subchapter or in any other provision of law shall be
construed to limit the authority of the United States to terminate or limit
such authorization. Nothing in this section relating to allowances shall be
construed as affecting the application of, or compliance with, any other
provision of this chapter to an affected unit or source, including the provi-
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What has changed? Surely, not the resource itself. Instead, the
technology regarding its allocation has changed, but this should
not mislead. Air, or properly speaking, the atmosphere, is a re-
source in which everyone has an interest.24 What that interest is
and how it might be equitably allocated are critical questions fac-
ing the use of the global commons that the atmosphere has come
to represent. If the sky is res communes, then it is owned in com-
mon and while it might be subject to government regulation, it is
not the government's to give away. In fact, all regulation or alloca-
tion of the assets that make up the sky are invested with a public
interest that defines the limits to actions the government may
take in relation to this resource. The federal government may no
more trade away the public's interest in the sky than the State of
Illinois could sell the shore of Lake Michigan.
One of the issues that drove the creation of United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea was the prospect that the more
technologically and economically advanced countries would be
able to capture a greater share of the value of the resources of the
oceans. The discussions underlying the treaty negotiations were
premised on the notion that the oceans are part of the common
property of mankind.25 In the same sense, the skies are also
sions related to applicable National Ambient Air Quality Standards and
State implementation plans.
Id. (emphasis added). Yet, for a similar phenomenon, see the discussion of property
rights in the radio spectrum in Howard A. Shelanski & Peter W. Huber, Administra-
tive Creation of Property Rights to Radio Spectrum, 41 J.L. & ECON. 581 (1998).
Section 301 of the Communications Act of 1934 plainly prohibits private
ownership of the radio spectrum.. .Government "control" may be defined
weakly as an ultimate, residual power like eminent domain, while
"not.. .ownership" may be defined strongly as anything short of fee sim-
ple. Substantial property rights lie in between, to be created or restricted
pursuant to the Commission's "public interest" authority under the Act.
Id. at 581-82 (footnotes omitted).
Professors Ackerman and Elliot argue that the emission reduction credits "are
not tax credits; rather, they are a new form of property that can be saved, sold, traded
or deposited in special 'banks.'" Ackerman & Elliot, supra note 1.
24. Professors Donald Elliot and Bruce Ackerman made this claim in their op-ed
piece almost twenty years ago. See Ackerman & Elliot, supra note 1. Professor Elliot
remarked to me, "I've always felt that the 'breathers' ought to share in the benefits of
trading programs." He also makes this argument in E. Donald Elliott, Toward Ecolog-
ical Law and Policy, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICY 170 (M. Chertow & D. Esty eds., Yale Univ. Press, 1997).
25. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122,
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982), available at http://www.un.orgDepts/los/unclos/
closindx.htm. The preamble to this states in part:
Desiring by this Convention to develop the principles embodied in Resolu-
tion 2749 (XXV) of 17 December 1970 in which the General Assembly of
236 [Vol. 18
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owned by all. The more technologically advanced among us may
not, by virtue of that technology alone, claim by rights a greater
share of the public resource than is justifiable within the context
of common ownership. 26 The public owns this property individu-
ally and collectively. Professor Carol Rose has suggested that one
of the two essential attributes of public property is that it is capa-
ble of monopolization without legal "doctrine securing [the] public
against such threats."27 The changes in both the industrial as well
as the legal technology has subjected the skies to just this threat
of essential monopolization of certain of it qualities. If the skies
are a species of public property that is owned in common, then
that turn is unjustified and effectively usurps a pre-existing claim
of the public.
Every property interest is composed of a variety of attrib-
utes. 28 The common interest in the skies entails an interest in the
quality of the air. Understood this way, it is easy to see that the
government regulates the quality of the air on behalf of the people
as a way of managing the common resource. Decisions about the
quality of this resource are thus not just examples of the general
police power of the government to protect the health and welfare
of the public. They may be that, but they are also more. They are
examples of the government exercising its trust responsibility in
relation to the common property interests that the people retain in
the skies.
the United Nations solemnly declared inter alia that the area of the sea-
bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction, as well as its resources, are the common heritage of man-
kind, the exploration and exploitation of which shall be carried out for the
benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of
States.
Id.
26. This is analogous to the rules governing riparian owners. Each riparian owner
could claim a share of the water resource that was associated with the riparian land,
but they could not (historically) take the water out of the watershed or diminish the
quality and quantity of the water available to other riparian owners.
27. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 773 (1986). The second essential element is
"the public's claim had to be superior to that of the private owner, because the proper-
ties themselves were most valuable when used by indefinite and unlimited numbers
of persons-by the public at large." Id.
28. Professors Rose and Alexander suggest that, at root, all property interests
share both propriety and commodity functions. The propriety function is that which
speaks to public ordering and interests that limit the commodity interests in prop-
erty. The struggle between these two functions is reflected in the ideology that drives
both scholarly discourse on property and doctrinal evolution.
2001] 237
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Much of the natural resources of this country have been re-
duced to private ownership. One of the historic mandates of the
Forest Service and the Department of the Interior was, in fact, to
transfer the public wealth into private hands.29 Despite the effects
of that policy, much of the natural resource base of the nation con-
tinues to be owned in common as a public resource. As I have al-
ready discussed, the category of public resource is not unitary.
There are those assets that are owned in fee by the state (but
which theoretically still belong to the polity). These assets may be
consumed or alienated subject to the limitations against corrup-
tion. There are also those assets that are owned by the people but
managed by the government on their behalf. This second category
includes the bulk of public resources held by the government.
Excluding those resources that have already been reduced to
individual private ownership, the people in common are the own-
ers of the natural resources within the national territory. Impor-
tant examples of such natural resources are national forest
timber, federal grazing lands, the radio broadcast spectrum, inter-
state waterways, and the atmosphere. These resources are public
property, managed by the federal government on behalf of the peo-
ple. The government may intervene to prevent any private party
from appropriating any part of these public resources, but even a
failure to intervene does not diminish the public nature of the re-
source. 30 Some resources were viewed historically as so vast as to
29. The Forest Reserve Act of 1891 and the Organic Administration Act of 1897,
30 Stat. 35 (1897) (codified as 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1994)), state that "No national forest
reservations shall be established except to improve and protect the forest within the
reservation, or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to
furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the
United States.... ." Gifford Pinchot explains, "The timber, water, pasture, mineral
and other resources of the forest reserves are for the use of the people. They may be
obtained under reasonable conditions. . .without delay. Legitimate improvements
and business enterprises will be encouraged." GIFFORD PINCHOT, BREAKING NEW
GROUND 263 (1947). Marion Clawson, former director of the BLM elaborates:
Ours is a private ownership society in many ways, but we have not found
extensive public ownership of land incompatible with a private ownership
philosophy. One reason is that the publicly owned lands are widely used
by private businesses and by individuals. Though publicly owned, the
land is dominantly privately used.
MARION CLAWSON, AMERICA'S LAND & ITS USES 27 (1972). For a critical review of this
history, see Douglas Trent, American Forests, in THE PIRACY OF AMERICA: PROFITEER-
ING IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 28 (Judith Scherff ed., 1999).
30. In this case, public property is vastly different from private property. A con-
tinued failure to intervene in defense of your interest in your property against specific
and identifiable trespassers may lead to a diminishment of the quality of your inter-
est (or loss of the interest all together in the case of adverse possession). There is no
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make policing their use nonsensical except when necessary to act
as a referee between private parties. 31
Assets that are held by the government for the benefit of the
people are distinguishable from other kinds of government prop-
erty. While the structure of ownership varies across the different
kinds of resources, the essential point should not be lost: The
United States Government holds public property in trust for all
the people, not just the people in some kind of symbolic or meta-
phoric sense. What the government does with these assets is sub-
ject to the supervision of the people. Thus defects in systems of
representation will be reflected in the quality of the supervision.
Taken seriously, the obligations flowing from the public trust doc-
trine reinforce democratic principles and suggest a pragmatic test
on the quality of government. The essence of government corrup-
tion is to use the power of the state to convert public assets for
personal gain.32 It is in this sense then, while not perhaps, ex-
actly technically accurate in every case, the people always hold
beneficial title.
The federal government derives its power to manage public
resources from the Constitution. Article Four of the United States
Constitution states that "Congress shall have power to dispose of
and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the terri-
tory or the property belonging to the United States."33 This sec-
tion contemplates that the U.S. government qua government will
own property that will be held or consumed in the interest of gov-
ernance. The government will also hold property that needs to be
managed rather than distributed or consumed. While the full
prescriptive interest that arises against public property, and it is easy to see why.
Just as there is no prescriptive use that arises against a common owner, recognizing a
private interest arising against public property would be akin to allowing an interest
to arise against yourself.
31. See GROTIUS, supra note 20. This point about the government function as refe-
ree is at the heart of nuisance and trespass jurisprudence. It is made most forcefully
in an article by Professor Joseph Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36
(1964), and in an article by Professor Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Prop-
erty Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L.
REV. 1089 (1972).
32. See, e.g., DENNIS THOMPSON & Amy GUTMANN, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT
(1996). Of course, this statement of corruption might be understood too narrowly. It
is also true that converting public assets for personal gain is usefully understood as a
subset of generally violating the fundamentally public nature of the government ser-
vice, and as such, is merely one of many examples.
33. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. Much of the debate surrounding this provision
hinged on whether it was restricted to land and land-based assets in the territories
outside of the original thirteen states.
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scope of this paragraph has never been definitively settled, it does
grant to the government the power to control and regulate public
property. 34 While there is no explicit constitutional limitation on
the exercise of this power, the constitution was not written on a
blank slate, and thus the power should not be understood to be
limitless.
The power contained in the property clause was originally
deemed largely related to the disposition of the land outside the
territorial limits of the original states, but within the land claimed
by the new nation. There was substantial controversy over the ex-
ercise of that power in the new territory as the country expanded.
Similarly, the federal government took the property in the name
of the people. The underlying law as understood at the time of the
drafting of the clause would naturally suggest that the power was
limited by the people's interest in it. 3 5 The government has an ob-
ligation to dispose of public property in a manner consistent with
this public trust.36 Professor Epstein suggests the real content of
these obligations:
The language of the public trust is far more than an idle meta-
phor because it is quite clear that the public official in question
cannot treat the proceeds of sale as their private property. In-
stead they are required to hold the moneys received as part of
the public treasury, that is, for the benefit of all the individuals
who had in the original position some undivided interest in the
[property] .37
34. See Kieppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976).
In brief, beyond the Fort Leavenworth and Paul dicta, appellees have
presented no support for their position that the Clause grants Congress
only the power to dispose of, to make incidental rules regarding the use
of, and to protect federal property. This failure is hardly surprising, for
the Clause, in broad terms, gives Congress the power to determine what
are "needful" rules "respecting" the public lands. And while the furthest
reaches of the power granted by the Property Clause have not yet been
definitively resolved, we have repeatedly observed that "(t)he power over
the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations."
Id. (citations omitted).
35. Although the case is morally radioactive for obvious reasons, Taney's discus-
sion in Dred Scott v. Sandford of the understanding of the meaning of property within
the contemplation of the drafters of the property clause remains instructive. See 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
36. See Steams v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223 (1900).
37. Epstein, supra note 5, at 421 (emphasis added).
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II. The Public Trust Doctrine
The modern use of the public trust doctrine has come in for
some heavy sailing lately. The criticism stems either from a belief
that it is too limited by its property roots to be of much use,38 or
that it only serves a limited function and distracts us from the
serious issues of environmental protection. 39 Yet, despite the crit-
icism, the doctrine provides us with a useful window into the justi-
fications for the existence of external limitations on government in
its use, management or disposal of property that is invested with
the common ownership claim of the people. The evolution of the
public trust doctrine is complex, but it is essentially rooted in Ro-
man law and from those laws through the various commentators
on Roman law.40
The Romans recognized that certain kinds of property were
not subject to private ownership or acquisition. 4 1 Individual con-
trol of some resources would run counter to what the Romans con-
ceived of as their natural purpose, and this property could not
therefore be subject to private ownership. Such things were called
res extra commercium. If a resource were excluded from private
ownership because by its nature it could only be used in common,
it was called res communes. Fish, wild game, rivers, and the sea
fell into this category. If a thing were set aside for public use by
38. See, e.g., Joseph Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from its Historical
Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185 (1980) [hereinafter Sax, Liberating the Public
Trust Doctrine].
39. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 17, at 710-716. "Simply put, the public trust
doctrine, even if aimed at promoting needed resource conservation and environmental
protection goals, is a step in the wrong direction." Id. at 715. But see Butler, supra
note 17.
40. Professor Butler reminds us that the commentaries were largely the work of
scholars interpreting Roman law rather than binding statements of the laws them-
selves. Nonetheless, the commentaries has a powerful impact on the evolution of En-
glish and through them American property conception. Of course, these conceptions
reflected to greater and lesser extents the social substrate up which the interpreta-
tions were being applied. See Butler, supra note 17, at 850.
41. Dean Daniel R. Coquillette, describes the four other categories of "things" ca-
pable of nonexclusive ownership or incapable of ownership besides res communes.
They are: "res universitatis, res sacre or religiosae, res publicae, and res nullius." Co-
quillette, supra note 4, at 802-803 (footnotes omitted). While I will not reproduce the
long footnotes, a brief description of each category is as follows: res universitatis were
those things held by a corporate body; res sacre or religiosae were those things dedi-
cated to the service of god, but also included the walls and gates to a city; res publicae
were those things which were common to all men "such as rivers or ports." Id. Dean
Coquillette notes that this category included property belonging to particular people
but "which may be used and enjoyed by all men," and res nullius were those things or
places that belonged to no one. Id.
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public functionaries or political community, it was categorized as
res publicae. Public buildings and the furniture within them are
examples of this category of property.4 2 Without looking too far,
you can locate in Roman law the antecedent to the contemporary
distinction between government property and public property.
The principle of res communes was expressed in the English
common law and in 19th century American law as jus publicum.43
The historic limitation of the reach of the public trust moderated
to the extent that public property such as natural resources are
owned by the state for the people. How does the state own it? Is it
always and everywhere the same as ordinary private fee simple
ownership? The lesson of the public trust doctrine is that such
properties are held by the state for the people and is limited by
those interests that are clearly public. In addition, to the extent
that the state ownership is of res communes, that ownership is
incomplete ownership. The beneficial interest in any res com-
munes is held by the people in common. The state does not own a
river or the sky like it owns the furniture in the state house. The
power of the government to divest the people of their common in-
terest is limited by the interests of the people. Even where such a
divestiture is justified, the proceeds of that transaction belong to
the people. What this means is that conservation of important re-
sources requires regulation of the use of res communes to elimi-
nate friction and prevent waste, and requires limitation on how
and by whom natural resources may be acquired in order to pre-
vent waste.44 This moderating governmental role is a central
tenet in the construction of the modern regulatory state.
42. See ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 197-98
(1925). This is a distinction that still makes sense when trying to understand the
various ways in which the government owns or otherwise controls resources.
43. See, e.g., State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 13 So. 640, 643 (Fla. 1893):
In this holding by the crown two distinct rights are regarded: (1) the jus
privatum, or right of property in the soil, which the king may grant, and
which may be held by a subject, and the grant of which will confer on the
grantee such privileges and benefits as can be enjoyed therein subject to
the jus publicum; (2) the jus publicum, the royal prerogative by which the
king holds such shores and navigable rivers for the common use and ben-
efit of all the subjects, and, indeed, of all persons of all nations at peace
with England, who may have occasion to use them for purposes of trade.
This royal right, or jus publicum, is held by the crown in trust for such
common use and benefit, and cannot be transferred to a subject, or alien-
ated, limited, or restrained, by mere royal grant, without an act of
parliament.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass (7 Cush.) 53 (1851)).
44. See POUND, supra note 42, at 199.
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The reasoning underlying the basic property categories of
public property and their attendant duties has been adopted in a
number of jurisdictions. 45 Court after court has recognized that
the government acts as a trustee for the benefit of the people of
the various states. 46 Despite the broad recognition of the limiting
function of the trust interest of the people in public property, there
is no clear warrant for the brute application of the rules that gov-
ern the states to the federal government, especially where the
there is no explicit constitutional language suggesting the limita-
tion.47 The United States Supreme Court has declared that it is
up to Congress to say how the public lands held in trust by the
government shall be administered. 48
Congress is the principle agent charged with the power to
manage or to dispose of public property. 49 Congress can therefore
sell resources or withhold them from sale,50 or dispose of them in
any other way consistent with the public interest, fixing the terms
on which the property may be used.51 The only limit that the Con-
stitution imposes on Congress' discretion is that it must act only
in a way that is "needful" in disposing of public property. The
meaning of what is "needful" has largely been given over to the
Congress to define and the definitions that have emerged have va-
ried with the historical epochs within which the decision was be-
ing taken. During the era of settlement and of the opening of the
West, what was needful were techniques to transfer resources into
the hands of those who would make the best use of them, although
counter examples to direct transfers to the private market like the
Reclamation Acts and the creation of the national park and na-
tional monument system also exist. Thus the deep public interest
in the resources controlled by the government was reflected in the
various statutes dealing with those resources even during the eras
when plutocrats seemed to have their way with the government.
The important point to note is that the definition of "needful" al-
ways contained within it the implicit limitation implied by the fi-
duciary duty the trustee government owes to her citizens. Even if
45. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 17.
46. See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 399 (1948).
47. See Metro Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
48. See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911). See also Cobell, 37 F.
Supp. 2d 6.
49. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
50. See Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897).
51. See Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 251 (1900).
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there is no explicit constitutional language fixing the dimensions
of this duty, there remain meaningful restraints on government
disposal of public property. The lessons from the states are useful
in determining just what those limits are. Particularly in cases
like Illinois Central, where the disposal of property interfered
with, or completely frustrated the public's right to use and enjoy
the resource, courts have either enjoined the government's action
or awarded compensation to those who have been deprived of their
public use-rights. 52
The easy answer to the disposal question has always been
that the conversion of the assets to money yields no loss to the
public. It merely converts the value of the resources into another
form that is more useful to government in satisfying their normal
obligations. Such a defense ignores the value of the resource in its
original state, and it removes the capacity of individuals to enjoy
the resource. Recycling the trust resource proceeds into the budget
does not address these problems. In fact, it may exacerbate them.
Moreover, there is no mandate in the Constitution that requires
that revenue from a disposition of property be committed to the
treasury as opposed to being distributed to the people.
Even though there are no specific examples of the application
of the public trust doctrine to the actions of the federal govern-
ment, there are, nonetheless, a number of examples that illustrate
both the existence of public trust, like limitations on federal re-
source policy, and provide useful analogies for the extension of the
doctrine to address the problems associated with the consumption
by a subset of the public of the pollution and carbon loading capac-
ity of the atmosphere.
III. Res Communes: Protecting the Sky for the People -
Doctrinal and Programmatic Analogies
The public trust doctrine supplies a broad framework that
supports the establishment of a mechanism to both capture the
value of the sky resource for the people as a whole and to super-
vise the government dealings in relationship to the carrying ca-
pacity of the atmosphere. While the public trust doctrine was
historically limited to regulating access to coastal or navigable wa-
ters, recent decisions have expanded the doctrine beyond this
52. See, e.g., Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387.
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traditional reach. 53 Much of this expansion has been in response
to contemporary environmental problems such as implementing a
comprehensive management plan for natural resources like the
American River in California. 54 The Mono Lake Case made clear
that environmental demands could be made on existing uses of
natural resources, and that those uses might have to be adjusted
in order to maintain or restore natural ecosystem values. 55
The public trust doctrine in its specific applications is limited
primarily to traditional natural systems. Properly understood,
however, the traditional rationale for the public trust doctrine
provides a necessary legal cornerstone for legislative action estab-
lishing a mechanism to protect the public interest in the sky. I
will call the public interest in the various qualities of the atmos-
phere the skytrust or the skytrust interest, although I am not sug-
gesting that the trust mechanism is the only way to capture the
value of the air resource for the public as a whole. Underlying the
narrow application to tidal and riparian lands is the much broader
concept of public entitlement to the benefits of certain natural sys-
tems and the resources that define them. The kinds of resources
that come within ambit of res communes ought to reflect our un-
derstanding of those resources. As our understanding evolves, the
kinds of resources subject to this analysis will also change. Thus,
the technological capacity to capture the various elements that
make up the air resource presents policy makers with the chal-
lenge of acquiring the value of the public resource for the people.
Congress has discretion to decide what to do with the wealth cap-
tured by the sale of carbon or pollution emission permits. The
strong version of the interests held by the people in the property
to be regulated by the skytrust interests suggests that Congress
might be obligated to account for the value of the resource. Moreo-
ver, as I will suggest below, how that value ought to be distributed
is complicated because of the various kinds of interests the people
give up. There are, in addition, other common assets that are reg-
ulated for the public benefit in a way analogous to the skytrust
interests. Moreover, the public's interest in public assets is not
53. See Butler, supra note 17, at 908, 922. See also Sax, Liberating the Public
Trust Doctrine, supra note 38.
54. See, e.g., Gegory S. Weber, Articulating the Public Trust: Text, Near-Text and
Context, 27 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1155 (1995).
55. Joseph L. Sax, Bringing an Ecological Perspective to Natural Resources Law:
Fulfilling the Promise of the Public Trust, in NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY & LAw:
TRENDS & DIRECTIONS, 152 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Sara F. Bates eds., 1993).
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limited to officially recognized ownership interests. 56 Certain es-
tablished expectations while not, strictly speaking, property inter-
ests, are important interests that the government risks
frustrating only at the expense of high demoralization costs. 57
A. Examples and Analogies
Federal law reflects the long engagement of the federal gov-
ernment with the management of natural resources and other
public properties. Moreover, the long list of federal statutes deal-
ing with the various resources reflect the balancing of private and
public interests that is essential to the justification for the crea-
tion of a skytrust mechanism. 58
56. See Gerald Torres, Taking and Giving: Police Power, Public Value, and Pri-
vate Right, 26 ENvTL. L. 1 (1996).
57. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
58. See Abandoned Mine Reclamation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat.
1388-289 (codified as 30 U.S.C. §§ 1231-1243); Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-
148, 81 Stat. 485; Alaska Coal Lands Act, 38 Stat. 741; American Fisheries Act Pub.
L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-616; Bartlett Act Pub. L. 89-658, 80 Stat. 908; Big South
Fork National River and Recreation Area Act, Pub. L. No. 93-251, 88 Stat. 43 (1974)
(codified as 16 U.S.C. § 460ee); Bureau of Mines Acts, 36 Stat. 369 (1910) (codified as
30 U.S.C. §§ 1-16); Burnt Timber Act, 37 Stat. 1015 (1913); California Wilderness Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-425, 98 Stat. 1619; Clean Air Act, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codified
as 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q); Coal Lands Act, 17 Stat. 607 (1873); Coastal Zone Man-
agement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972) (codified as 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-
1465); Commercial Fisheries Research and Redevelopment Act, Pub. L. No. 88-309,
78 Stat. 197 (1964); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675); Dam Acts, 34 Stat. 386 (June 21, 1906); Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources
Act, Pub. L. No. 96-28394, Stat. 553 (1980) (codified as 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473); Deep-
water Port Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-627, 88 Stat. 2126 (codified as 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1501-1524); Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-645, 100 Stat.
3582; Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) (codified as 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544); Federal Cave Resources Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
691, 102 Stat. 4546; Federal Flood Insurance Acts, 70 Stat. 1078 (1956) (codified as 16
U.S.C. §§ 4301-4310); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 61 Stat.
163 (1947) (codified as 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y); Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976 Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744 (codified as 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785);
Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101
Stat. 1330-256; Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387); Federal Water
Project Recreation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-72, 79 Stat. 213 (1965); Fish and Game Sanctu-
ary Act, 48 Stat. 400 (1934); Fish and Wildlife Improvement Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-616, 92 Stat. 3110; Flood Control Acts, 39 Stat. 948 (1917); Game and Wildlife Act,
49 Stat. 378 (1935); Gas Guzzler Tax, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3180 (1978); Gulf
Islands National Seashore Act, Pub. L. No. 91-660, 84 Stat. 1967 (1971); Helium Act,
Pub. L. No. 86-777, 74 Stat. 918 (1925) (codified as 50 U.S.C. §§ 164-167n); Hot Oil
Act, 49 Stat. 30 (1935); Inland Navigation Rules, 30 Stat. 96 (1897) (codified as 33
C.F.R. pt. 89); Interjurisdictional Fisheries Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-659, 100 Stat.
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Perhaps the best example of federal regulation of an intangi-
ble resource that is expressly invested with a public interest is the
regulation of the broadcast spectrum. Why should the broadcast
spectrum be public property subject to complete regulation by the
federal government?59 One answer is that the potential for both
private monopolization of the resource and the potential for chaos
3731 (16 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4107); Joshua Tree National Monument Act, 64 Stat. 1033
(1950) (codified as 16 U.S.C. §§ 410aaa-21 to -27); Kentucky Wilderness Act of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-197, 99 Stat. 1351; Land and Water Conservation Fund Act, Pub. L.
No. 88-578, 78 Stat. 897 (1964) (codified as 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4 through 4601-11);
Marine Mineral Resources Research Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-325, 110 Stat. 3994
(codified as 30 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1905); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052 (codified as 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445);
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (codified as 16 U.S.C. 703-712); Multi-
ple Use Mining Act of 1955, 69 Stat. 367 (1955); National Park Service Organic Act,
39 Stat.535 (1916); National Trails System Act, Pub. L. 90-543, 82 Stat. 919 (1968)
(codified as 16 U.S.C. 1241-1251); National Wildlife Refuge Administration Act, Pub.
L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 283 (1969); Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified as
15 U.S.C. 717-717z); Navigation Acts, 30 Stat. 1152 (1899); Northwest Atlantic Fish-
eries Act, 64 Stat. 1067 (1950) (codified as 16 U.S.C. 981-991); Open Space Land Act,
Pub. L. No. 87-70, 75 Stat. 149 (1961) (codified as 42 U.S.C. 1500-1500e); Outer Banks
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 555 (1990); Outer Continental Lands
Act, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (43 U.S.C. 1331-1356); Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified as 7 U.S.C. 2321-2583); Public Lands Sales
Acts, 9 Stat. 51 (1846); Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
514, 92 Stat. 1803 (codified as 43 U.S.C. 1901-1908); Quinebaug and Shetucket Rivers
Valley National Heritage Corridor Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-449, 108 Stat. 4752; Recla-
mation Acts, 32 Stat. 388 (1902); Reforestation Relief Act, 48 Stat. 22 (1933); Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795
(1976) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k); Rivers and Harbor Act, 46 Stat. 918
(1930); Rural Electrification Act, 49 Stat. 1363 (1936) (codified as 7 U.S.C. 901-950aa-
1); Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93- 523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974) (codi-
fied as 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26); Shore Line Erosion Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 89-
298, 79 Stat. 1095 (1965); Smith Act, 39 Stat. 506 (1916); Soil Conservation and Do-
mestic Allotment Act, 49 Stat. 163 (1935); Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 89-
272, 79 Stat. 997 (1965) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k); Submerged Lands Act,
67 Stat. 29 (1953) (codified as 43 U.S.C. 1301-1356); Surface Mining Control and Rec-
lamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328);
Swamp Land Act, 9 Stat. 519 (1850); Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 48 Stat.
58 (16 U.S.C. 831-831ee); Tin Protection Act, 49 Stat. 1140 (1936); Trans-Alaska Pipe-
line Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 584 (1973) (codified as 43 U.S.C.
1651-1656); United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
294, 94 Stat. 633 (1980) (codified as 42 U.S.C. 8701-8795); Upper Colorado Act, 70
Stat. 105 (1956); Virginia Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-586, 98 Stat. 3105;
Volunteers in the National Forests Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-300, 86 Stat. 147
(1972); Water Desalination Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-298, 110 Stat. 3622; Wetlands
and Wildlife Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-312, 112 Stat. 2958; Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act, Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (1968) (codified as 16 U.S.C. 1271-
1287); Yellowstone National Park Protection Act, 28 Stat. 73 (1894); Youth Conserva-
tion Corps Act of 1970 Pub. L. No. 91-378, 84 Stat. 794 (16 U.S.C. § 1701-1729).
59. The typical answer is, of course, that the Commerce Clause gives Congress
the power to regulate interstate businesses. But even that answer does not go far
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without some enforceable allocation scheme make the public in-
terest in regulation and control apparent. Moreover, maximizing
the public use of the resource increases the value of the broadcast
spectrum. Thus the broadcast spectrum is precisely that kind of
property that has historically been subject to public ownership. 60
The regulatory scheme for the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, as
well as title II of the Communications Act of 1932, were largely an
adaptation of railroad regulations to the communications field.
Because the 1932 Act was organizational not substantive, the
background of the Mann-Elkins Act provides the necessary sub-
stantive history. Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover regarded
the airwaves as a public good. At the Fourth National Radio Con-
ference in 1925 he declared:
The ether is a public medium, and its use must be for a public
benefit. The use of a radio channel is justified only if there is a
public benefit. The dominant elements for consideration in the
radio field is, and always will be, the great body of the listening
public, millions in number, countrywide in distribution.61
At the time Hoover made that speech, it was difficult to envision
just what the benefits of the broadcast spectrum would be. Since
that time, regulation and ownership of the broadcast spectrum
has been an evolving area of public policy and governmental ac-
tion.62 The recent innovations in wireless communication merely
highlight the continuing value of the resource. The value of the
radio spectrum would have been lost as a public resource if it had
been treated as a purely private resource or if it had been divested
of a public interest during the initial licensure. During Hoover's
time the benefits from these atmospheric natural systems were
towards justifying the categorization of the broadcast spectrum as a public resources
subject to allocation by the federal government.
60. See Rose, supra note 27, at 774.
61. Herbert J. Hoover, Proceedings of the Fourth National Radio Conference,
Washington D.C. 7 (Nov. 9-11, 1925) (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office).
"The ether is a public medium, and its use must be for public benefit." J. Roger Wol-
lenberg, The FCC as Arbiter of "The Public Interest, Convenience, and Necessity," in A
LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934 68 (Max D. Paglin ed.,
1989) (quoting Herbert J. Hoover, Speech at the Fourth National Radio Conference
(1925)).
62. See generally, Howard A. Shelanski & Peter W. Huber, Administrative Crea-
tion of Property Rights to Radio Spectrum, 41 J.L. & ECON. (1998) (dedicated to ana-
lyzing the problems associated with the regulation of the broadcast spectrum in the
face of rapidly changing technological capabilities that change not only the uses of the
broadcast spectrum, but substantially alter the value profile as well).
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limited to increasing the communication available to the average
citizen. Now it seems clear that two more benefits are readily
available: the maintenance of air quality through the reduction of
pollution and the concomitant pecuniary benefits arising from
selling the carbon-loading capacity of the atmosphere.
The legislative history of the Radio Act of 1927 repeatedly re-
fers to "public ownership of the ether."6 3 There was no discussion,
however, of the public retaining the benefits of that ownership be-
cause managing the radio spectrum was perceived as a problem of
engineering and not one of economics. In its haste to move in the
public interest to eliminate or, at minimum, reduce the chaos then
ruling on the airwaves the possibilities of market mechanisms and
public ownership were ignored.
That the government regarded the airwaves as public prop-
erty is implied by repeated demands, following Hoover, that
broadcasters reserve portions of their resources for "public inter-
est" programming. That the broadcasters quickly supported this
concept may indicate their own understanding that they were us-
ing a resource belonging to the public. 64 Indeed, it would be diffi-
cult to infer a more reasonable explanation for the discussions of
public benefit than that the broadcast spectrum was "owned" in
some sense by the citizens of the nation.65
The broadcast spectrum is not the only resource that is man-
aged for the public by regulating private use. The oceans and its
resources provide additional examples. The Fishermen's Contin-
63. 68 CONG. REC. 2573 (1927), 68 CONG. REC. 2872 (1927), stating "ether is the
inalienable possession of the people," or that ownership of the ether remained with
the government.
64. See Glen 0. Robinson, Spectrum Property Law 101, 41 J.L. & ECON. 609
(1998).
65. Of course, Howard A. Shelanski and Peter W. Huber demonstrate that almost
all of the elements of private ownership have been counterfeited for the current li-
cense holders and that this effects efficiency in the use of the radio spectrum. See
Shelanski & Huber, supra note 23. Moreover, Glen 0. Robinson in his essay in the
same issue of the Journal of Law and Economics, notes that the broadcasters would
have eagerly subjected themselves to a "public interest" broadcasting requirement in
exchange for paying full value for the rights. See Robinson, supra note 64. As he puts
it:
The choice of characterizations seems to reduce to contest between ra-
tional expectations theory, which holds that only the suckers are fooled by
government, and P.T. Barnum's theory, which claims that a sucker is
born every minute. Of course, for their part, the broadcasters could spot a
bargain when they saw it: trading 3 hours of children's programming for
free use of a second channel was for them a bargain unequaled since Pe-
ter Minuit bought Manhattan for $24 worth of beads.
Id. at 618.
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gency Fund was created to eliminate conflicts between competing
interests on the outer continental shelf.66 The specific conflict ad-
dressed by this fund is that between those who exploit the shelf
for the fishing resource and those who want to exploit the petro-
leum resource. Both resources were defined as public property (in
fact, both trace their legal roots to those property doctrines cover-
ing ownership of wild animals on unclaimed land). The fund al-
lows fishermen to recover for damages that result from outer
continental shelf oil exploration by filing a claim directly with the
federal government, as opposed to seeking out the party actually
responsible for the damage.
The Fishermen's Contingency Fund is designed to compen-
sate fishermen whose equipment is damaged as a result of hydro-
carbon exploration on the outer continental shelf.6 7 The
Department of the Interior requires every leaseholder under the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 68 holders of exploration per-
mits, or holders of pipeline easements to contribute to the fund. 69
A Department of the Interior audit of the party's operation deter-
mines the amount that the party must pay to the fund, 70 although
no assessment can exceed $5,000, 71 and the total amount collected
in one year cannot exceed $2,000,000.72 The money is deposited in
the U.S. Treasury, where it can be invested to generate additional
revenue for the fund.73
The Secretary of the Interior can pay money out of the fund to
satisfy actual and consequential damages to fishermen due to
damage or loss of fishing gear due to activities associated with
outer continental shelf oil exploration.74 Fishermen can be com-
pensated out of the fund for up to fifty percent of their economic
loss. 75 The United States also acquires subrogation rights to the
claimant's injury, which the government can pursue and deposit
any amount recovered in the fund's treasury account. 76 There is
no ceiling on how much a claimant can file for under the statute.
66. See 43 U.S.C. § 1801.
67. See id. § 1842.
68. See id. §§ 1331-1356.
69. See id. § 1842(b)(1).
70. See 50 C.F.R. § 296.3(b)(2).
71. See 43 U.S.C. § 1842(b)(1).
72. See id. § 1842(a)(1)(C).
73. See id. § 1842(a)(1).
74. See id. § 1843(c)(1).
75. See id.
76. See 43 U.S.C. § 1845(h)(2).
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The Fishermen's Contingency Fund is relevant to a mecha-
nism like a skytrust, because the fund affords one party with an
interest in a common resource, the outer continental shelf, and a
mechanism of recovery for harms suffered as a result of a second
party's use of the interest. Fishermen are entitled to fish in the
seas, just as much as oil companies are entitled to search seabeds
for oil. Invariably, however, conflicts emerge as fishing lines get
caught on pipelines, and the fisherman's equipment is harmed
without her or him knowing which oil company's pipeline de-
stroyed the line or net. The cost of litigation to recover for such
loses would be time consuming and expensive. The imposition of
these costs on the fishing industry would lead to the impoverish-
ment of the industry. Moreover, problems of proof would make
success less likely and could ultimately lead to the under-utiliza-
tion of the valuable fish and shellfish resources in the outer conti-
nental shelf area.
Because of the problems that these conflicts posed, the federal
government stepped in to ensure that fishermen would be com-
pensated for damage to their equipment. The oil companies are
required to pay into a compensation fund as a condition of their
right to explore and extract resources from the outer continental
shelf. While this might be viewed as an insurance scheme, it is
merely a way to mediate conflicts in private interests in public
property. This is especially important not only where there is a
relative imbalance in the power of the claimants, but also where a
public good is served by both uses. The importance of this solution
to the justification for a skytrust mechanism is plain. A skytrust
mechanism is designed to defend the public's interest in the at-
mospheric resource. Post hoc vindication, however, takes shape as
a way to compensate the American people for the loss of their in-
terest in the clean air asset occasioned by existing regulatory re-
gimes as well as those that are contemplated within the context of
emission transfers. Air polluters impinge on the quality of life of
citizens who suffer a decreased quality of air as a result of air pol-
lution and risk long term losses associated with the excess carbon
loading of the atmosphere. As I will discuss later, the imposition
of a comprehensive regulatory regime inhibits the private defense
of the right to use the common resource and is thus a further justi-
fication for a mechanism that will perform that function.
The statutes regulating U.S. timber resources on public lands
create a regulatory scheme that seeks to provide people with
needed resources while at the same time preventing waste. The
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Act allows for the sale of timber from market lands at a fair mar-
ket value.7 7 The money generated by timber sales is deposited in
the Treasury for use by the federal government for activities that
ostensibly benefit the American people. In the sale of timber, and
other natural resources, the relationship between the government
and the people is analogous to that of an agent and the principal.
An agent can make sales of a principal's assets and use those pro-
ceeds for the benefit of the principal. The agent is limited to au-
thority granted by the principal. Where do we find the limiting
power? The conventional answer is that the Congress as a func-
tion of its representative capacity can determine what power the
principal conveyed. In private markets such a delegation would be
rejected as no limit at all. The limits to the authority of the agent
ought to be determined by the nature of the interest of the princi-
pal. Within the context of the public trust doctrine the relation-
ship is bounded by that of trustee and beneficiary. 78
The United States has endeavored to adopt a timber policy
that maximizes the use of its timber resources. In 1878, Congress
enacted section 604 of Title XVI, which allowed for the free use of
timber found on land with mineral resources. The statute allowed
for the free use of the timber for " building, agricultural, mining,
or other domestic purposes."7 9 The right of a person to access this
timber was conditioned on approval from the Department of the
Interior. 0 This statute, in an effort to control waste of public re-
sources, conferred on any American the right to use timber that
would otherwise be squandered as a result of mining operations.
The granting of the mining concession did not carry with it the
right to ignore the public interest that was invested in the prop-
erty being conveyed. The capacity to capture this value lay at the
heart of the salvage provision.
77. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 472a(a), (e)(1)(A).
78. This view was crucial to the Supreme Court's analysis of the issue in the Illi-
nois Central case, but it is also the primary point of contention among later commen-
tators who sought to find in the case a basis for challenging the procedural regularity
and substantive content of an administrative or legislative decision. As Professor Sax
put it:
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the
general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any
governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that re-
source to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest
of private parties.
Sax, Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, supra note 17, at 490.
79. 16 U.S.C. § 604.
80. See 43 C.F.R. § 5510.0-3.
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As far back as 1904, the purpose of this statute was recog-
nized as enabling "settlers in the regions where timber is scarce to
utilize it for domestic and mining purposes, and especially to de-
velop the mineral resources of the rough, mountainous districts,
where agricultural pursuits could not be profitably followed."81
The statute was a means to allow people to capitalize on a re-
source that was held for them by their government.
The analogy to atmospheric regulation is apparent. By ena-
bling the public to capture the value of the pollution and carbon-
loading capacity of the atmosphere, people, who are otherwise ex-
cluded from exploiting the value of a resource, are given a chance
to capitalize on a common resource that is damaged or consumed
by other common owners. Section 604 of the Act permitted people
other than the owner of the mining concession to use the timber
on mineral tracts, thus preventing it from going to waste or al-
lowing mining companies to claim it by default.
The multiple use - sustained yield principle that guides ex-
ploitation of the nation's timber resource in theory permits use
and conservation to be twin policy goals at the same time as the
various interests of the public in the resource are protected. The
skytrust shares an insight with the way that the government pro-
motes conservation of timber resources while still allowing use of
the natural resource. By focusing on the prevention of waste and
(at least in theory) pricing timber usage at market rates the effect
is that those who would consume the resource are limited to an
amount of the resource they can afford to consume. By capturing
the value of the sky resource for all common owners, a skytrust
would prevent waste and overuse. With a mechanism to capture
the skytrust interest the deterrent polluters face is that they must
pay for the portion of the atmosphere's pollution and carbon-load-
ing capacity that their operation consumes. Polluters cannot con-
tinue to simply use whatever amount of the atmosphere that their
operation can consume.
The ocean resource has been a focus of federal as well as in-
ternational regulation largely to reconcile the various competing
demands on the resource according the principles that maximize
their present economic and use value while conserving their long
term value. The federal mechanism for regulating fishing is aimed
at preserving fish as a natural resource that is both commercially
81. United States v. Rossi, 133 F. 380, 383 (1904).
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and recreationally valuable.8 2 The federal scheme for regulating
fishing differentiates between domestic fishing and fishing by for-
eigners in U.S. waters. Regional Fishery Management Councils
oversee domestic fishing.8 3 These councils are under a mandate
from Congress to create fishery management plans8 4 for their re-
gions as a means of deterring over-fishing.8 5 These plans specify
the optimum level at which domestic fishermen can harvest fish.
The only federal guideline for setting this level is that it must pre-
vent over-fishing. 6 Over-fishing is defined as the rate of fishing
at which the long-term viability of the stock of fish is threatened.8 7
The Regional Fishery Management Councils have complete dis-
cretion in the regulation of fishing in their regions. The councils
can, for example, allow domestic fishermen to fish without a per-
mit. If the council chooses to require permits, domestic fishermen
must obtain a permit and pay the fees for it to the Secretary of
Interior.88 Foreign fishermen are prohibited from U.S. waters un-
less they have obtained a permit from the Secretary of the Interior
or there is an applicable international treaty8 9 that grants them
rights in U.S. waters. Like domestic fishermen, the take of foreign
fishermen is limited by the region's fishery management plan.90
In the same way that the goals which are part of the regula-
tion of the timber resource, the regulatory scheme created by the
federal government to oversee fishing attempts to mediate com-
mercial and non-commercial interests in a common resource. The
point of the regulations is to assure that the Congress sets the
limits on the use of the resource at a sustainable level in order to
protect the interests of those currently unable to benefit from the
economic value of the resource. This restriction prevents the total
capture of the resource value by those with the current resources
or technology that would enable them to do so. Like the fishing
conservation regulations, the essence of a skytrust mechanism is
contained in the effort to balance the interests in the atmosphere
between polluters with the interest of other common owners.
Without a mechanism like a skytrust, polluters have the ability to
82. See 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1), (3).
83. See id. § 1852(a).
84. See id. § 1852(g).
85. See id. § 1851(a)(1).
86. See 50 C.F.R. § 600.310(b).
87. See id. § 600.310(c).
88. See 16 U.S.C. § 1853(b)(1).
89. See id. § 1821(a)(1).
90. See id. § 1853(a)(4)(B).
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capitalize on the atmosphere in a manner that the non-polluting
public cannot.91 The skytrust allows the public to capitalize on
their interest in the atmosphere, from which they would otherwise
be excluded. In addition, by limiting the polluters' use of the at-
mosphere to what they can afford, like the fishermen, those with
the technological capacity to do so cannot use whatever amount
they desire, only that part they have acquired from the public.
The regulation of resources to balance consumption with sus-
tainability in order to vindicate the public's continuing interest in
the resource is not the only source of support in policy for some-
thing like a skytrust. There are other examples of trusts estab-
lished by the government to benefit the public that begin with a
public resource as the corpus of the trust. Moreover, the federal
government is not the only level of government that has used
trusts as a way of capturing value of public resources for the peo-
ple. The use of the trust vehicle is important, because it creates
enforceable obligations for which there is clear guidance arising
from private practice that can directly inform the limitations on
the exercise of governmental power.
Although they are not a perfect fit, and the ways in which the
trustee's obligations have been adjudicated has often left much to
be desired, a specific historic example of the use of a trust mecha-
nism to manage public resources can be found in the land trusts
that southern and southwestern states hold for the benefit of pub-
lic school districts. These trusts date back over 200 years.92
When establishing the rules governing the Northwest Territory,
Congress instituted the practice of reserving sections of land in
every township in the for the maintenance of public schools. 93 The
Land Ordinance of 1785, which provided for the survey and sale of
the Northwest Territory, "reserved the Lot No. 16, of every town-
91. Critics might assert that the general public capitalizes on its interest in the
atmosphere's pollution loading capacity by driving cars and making use of other con-
veniences of modern life that add to the atmospheric pollution load. While it is true
that for some areas of the country, southern California and the Los Angeles basin
being the signal examples, private automobiles are the principal culprits in the accu-
mulated air pollution, the suggestion that the capitalization is the same is mislead-
ing. First, the burden of reducing automobile air pollution is on the consumer of
automobiles. As the older fleet of cars is retired, the new fleet must meet ever more
stringent pollution control standards. The added costs of these measures are recycled
into the cost of the cars themselves. Second, to the extent that this is true, the profits
associated with pollution reduction are captured by the manufacturers rather than by
the consumers.
92. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 268 (1986).
93. See id.
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ship, for the maintenance of public schools within the said town-
ship."94 In 1802, when Ohio gained statehood, Congress granted
Ohio the lands that had been reserved under the 1785 Ordinance
for the use of Ohio public schools. 95 Following the Ohio example,
"grants were made for common school purposes to each of the pub-
lic-land States admitted to the Union."96
Three examples of states that have maintained land trusts to
benefit public schools are Mississippi, 97 Arizona,98 and Utah. 99
When Arizona became a state, the Federal government granted to
it four sections in each township-an approximate total of eight
million acres-for the support of common schools.100 These lands
are considered federally donated lands, held in trust by the
State. 10 1 The Supreme Court has recognized that the United
States "has a continuing interest in the administration of both the
lands and the funds which derive from them."1 0 2 Thus, title to
these public school trust lands are not fully vested in the State,
but are rather encumbered by trust obligations the administration
of which the Federal government, as grantor, has an interest in
overseeing. Observe that the sovereign status of the state did not
prevent the enforcement of the trust obligations.
The terms of Arizona's (and New Mexico's) land trust were
originally set forth in the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act 36
Stat. 557.103 This law describes the manner and means by which
Arizona may use and dispose of the land and funds derived from
it.104 In Lassen v. Arizona, the Supreme Court asserted its federal
administrative interest in the trust's maintenance.' 0 5 The Court
addressed the questions of (1) whether Arizona could obtain trust
lands for purposes not designated in the grant (specifically to lay
94. Id. (citing 1 Laws of the United States 565 (1815)).
95. See id. at 268-69.
96. Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 506-507, n.7 (1980).
97. See, e.g., 478 U.S. 265.
98. See, e.g., Alamo Land & Cattle Co., Inc. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295 (1976); see
also Lassen v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 458 (1967).
99. For a discussion of Utah and other states' dilemmas in using public school
lands within trust duties while also producing revenues for public schools, see gener-
ally Scott T. Evans, Revisiting the Utah School Trust Lands Dilemma: Golden Arches
National Park, 11 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 347 (1991).
100. See Lassen, 385 U.S. at 461 n.2.
101. See id. at 459.
102. Id. at 460.
103. See id. at 461.
104. See id.
105. See Lassen, 385 U.S. at 461.
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State highways), and (2) the standard of compensation that Ari-
zona must pay to the trust in compensation for the land it uses.106
In answer to the first question, the Court began with the Ena-
bling Act, which provided that "lands be sold or leased only to the
highest bidder at a public auction," that "no lands be sold for a
price less than their appraised value," and that "[d]isposition of
any said lands... contrary to the [terms of the trust] shall be
deemed a breach of trust."10 7 The Court was therefore to deter-
mine whether the State's use of the land for roadways constituted
a breach of trust under the Act. 108 After examining the legislative
history of the Act, the Court observed that the purpose behind the
terms was to assure that the trust received full and fair compensa-
tion for the use and disposition of trust lands.'0 9 The Court ac-
cordingly held that the State's use of trust land for public
highways was consonant with the trust as long as the trust re-
ceived compensation of at least the appraised value of the prop-
erty interest used." 0  The Court further held that the
compensation owed the trust could not be offset by the value-en-
hancement represented by the roads as improvements."' In a
similar way, the public is not compensated for its loss of value in
the sky resource merely because pollution is reduced. That may be
an ancillary benefit, but it is not an offset against any claims that
might be constructed. This is a good point to be reminded of the
construction of the obligations suggested by Professor Epstein:
The problem of disposing of public property thus raises the mir-
ror image of public use and just compensation questions under
the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.... ."No public prop-
erty may be transferred to private use, without just compensa-
tion," payable to the public at large.112
This formulation not only locates a constitutional obligation for
the management of res communes, but keeps the focus on the pub-
lic dimension of the property.
A few important implications for a skytrust arise from the
Court's analysis of the school land trust's maintenance. First,
106. See id.
107. Id. at 462.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 463-464.
110. See Lassen, 385 U.S. at 465-466.
111. See id.
112. Epstein, supra note 5, at 419 (emphasis in the original).
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Congress enacted the public school land acts for the immediate
purpose of benefiting citizens, and they are arrangements for
managing a natural resource that is subject to laws of scarcity and
competing uses. Second, the beneficiary school systems and the
highway department are thus competing users who each assert a
public interest as their fundamental motivation for their use of
the resource-much as citizens and polluting facilities are in com-
petition for the atmosphere. 113 Finally, the Federal government
maintains an interest in the trusts' maintenance through its sta-
tus of grantor.
In this context, the Court in Lassen performed a traditional
"intent-of-the-grantor" analysis to weigh the competing uses of the
land against the fundamental interests of the trust. In holding
that Arizona may dispose of lands used for roads without an auc-
tion, the Court recognized that the State highway department, as
a competing user, could obtain its interest without an auction (rec-
ognizing an attribute of state sovereignty that was not explicitly
limited in the creation of the school land interest). In holding that
the State must, however, compensate the trust for the full market
value of the land, the Court recognized that a balance between
competing users must not violate the fundamental purpose of the
trust. Perhaps most strikingly analogous to a skytrust in Lassen
is the Court's rigid refusal to allow the improvement value of the
road to offset the compensation due to the trust.
This is analogous to the argument underlying a skytrust, that
citizens must be compensated for the diminishment of their inter-
est in a clean atmosphere, without regard to any offsetting bene-
fits that polluters confer by the production of electricity or the
production of jobs or other benefits. To permit such offsets is to
allow the person who reduces the quality (and quantity) of a re-
source to determine its value unilaterally. It also permits the sub-
stitution of incommensurables. In short, Lassen's brief analysis
provides a powerful analogy to the logic of something like a sky-
trust, and is also a good example of a governmentally-maintained
trust for specific public benefit which bears the essential incidents
of a private trust-fiduciary obligation, the requirement that fair
compensation be received for the sale or other disposal of trust
113. The Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Public Utility Holding Company Act re-
present the competing public interest spheres at stake in the emissions trading
problematic.
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property, and recourse to the courts to enforce these
obligations. 114
If the property in question is characterized as trust property,
the logical inquiry is who are the beneficiaries to the trust? Essen-
tial to the argument I have been making is that everyone holds an
interest in the sky. Thus, any holder of that interest has a right to
seek an accounting either from his fellow users or from the state
that has allowed an unequal distribution of allocations to develop.
The mechanism of this accounting is difficult to describe, espe-
cially if the government is the agent to be held to the accounting.
There are substantial limitations to government liability that can
only be overcome by the government itself.115 Nonetheless, the
first step is to locate the interest and the claim to a remedy for the
diminution of resource quality in common interest holders. The
summary is that each citizen has a legal interest and entitlement
to defend the common asset of clean air. Once the atmosphere is
understood as a common asset it is easy to see that this is not a
bizarre idea. As Dean Coquillette has demonstrated, "the English
by the sixteenth century had almost created [a privately enforcea-
ble legal remedy for disturbing the enjoyment of the res com-
munes] in the laws of the forest .... [Injury to those who had
rights to use the forest was subject to three nuisance ac-
114. See Alamo Land & Cattle Co., Inc. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295 (1976). The Court
there held that the trust was entitled to the current full value of the land, minus the
value of a burdening leasehold interest, in compensation for federal condemnation of
trust land. See also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265. In that case, Mississippi had
exchanged trust lands that were formerly clouded by Indian title for railroad bonds
the payment of which was made near-impossible by Civil War destruction. The af-
fected districts sued the State for breach of fiduciary duty and violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, on the theory that the state of affairs pursuant to the ancient
transaction had left the affected school districts vastly under subsidized. The Court
held that the breach of trust claim was barred by the Eleventh Amendment, because
the claim sought damages for a past violation. However, the Court held that the
Equal Protection Claim was viable even though it rested on the same theory underly-
ing the breach of trust claim.
115. The foundation for this claim lies in the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The
United States Supreme Court has made it harder in the last few terms for the Con-
gress to abrogate state sovereign immunity. The lode star case is Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), but two sets of opinions in the 1998-99 term
further cemented this trend towards restricting access to federal courts for actions of
the states. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (invalidating the provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act that authorize private suits against states in their own
courts without their consent); see also College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Post-
secondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (holding that Congress was
barred by the Eleventh Amendment from amending the Lanham Act permitting suits
in federal court against states for false advertising).
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tions. . .. "116 Most of the injuries that were remedied by these
actions were initially tied to ownership of a freehold tenement, 117
but even that limitation was abandoned by the end of the 16th
century.1 18 This development of the right to protect an interest in
the res communes was predicated on the idea that the right that
was being defended was a right to use rather than a right to exclu-
sively possess an asset held in common. The idea of common own-
ership required a correlative right in every other claimant. One
difficulty with carrying these arguments forward is that the legal
claims predicated on common use rights collapsed in the face of
the enclosure movement.' 19 One of the critical elements of the en-
closure movement was the abolition of common rights. Elimina-
tion of competing claimants was often accomplished through the
device of a fictive agreement to consolidate holdings that was rati-
fied by a decree in the Chancery courts.1 20
Thus, there are competing traditions within the law. Explana-
tions for the elimination of common land to enclosure varies with
no settled theory carrying conclusive weight, especially because
the rate of enclosure and the source of legitimization varied from
district to district in England.1 21 Yet, despite the elimination of
one form of common ownership (and perhaps the one most likely
to yield) other forms persisted. As I have demonstrated, these
forms have continued vitality largely within the context of public
resources that were thought to originate in public ownership or
which were understood to be incapable of exclusive possession.
Perhaps more importantly, the form of obligation that flows from
continued recognition of a public interest in this class of public
resource also recognizes the perils of monopoly where the private
capture overwhelms the common interest. Thus, the critical point
supporting the establishment of the skytrust is not that the gov-
116. Coquillette, supra note 4, at 804-805 (footnotes omitted).
117. See id. at 806-07.
118. Id.
119. See J.A. YELLING, COMMON FIELD AND ENCLOSURE IN ENGLAND 1450-1850
(Archon Books 1977).
120. See id. at 7-10. The fictive agreement was only one method of consolidating
enclosures, Yelling's book details the other methods, including legislative action, that
ultimately concluded in the complete dominance of the primacy of exclusive owner-
ship as the benchmark definition of property. This was captured by Coke and im-
ported into the property jurisprudence of the American colonies. Nonetheless, Butler
argues that traces of the commons traditions survived into colonial America and
moved from actions between private parties to include what we call the public trust
doctrine today. See Butler, supra note 17.
121. YELLING, supra note 119, at 30-95.
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ernment has the authority to act. Instead, the government has an
obligation of to act.122 This obligation stems from the basic norms
underlying the common law allocation of right and duties. This is
especially important given the current taking jurisprudence in the
Supreme Court that supposes that the limits of the common law
define the reach of state regulatory authority. 123 Connecting the
common asset claims for the skytrust to the common law structure
of property entitlements is an essential analytic move.
B. Nuisance as an Historical Defense of a Common Right to
Clean Air.
As suggested in the brief discussion of the use of nuisance and
"actions on the case" to support the right of users of common as-
sets to be free from interference from other private uses, 124 the
history of nuisance law supports the proposition that each citizen
possesses an interest in clean air that is impaired by current emis-
sions trading schemes. This argument does not assert that citi-
zens hold exclusive property rights in the atmosphere. Rather, it
recognizes that each person holds an entitlement to be free of
harmful air pollution and that emission trading transactions must
compensate citizens in return for the diminishment in those enti-
tlements. What follows is the structure of the argument that the
evolution of the common law nuisance doctrine that provides a
policy basis for the skytrust.
At common law, a defendant's nuisance interferes with an in-
tangible property right held by the plaintiff-namely, the right to
be free of the nuisance. One way of adjudicating the plaintiff's
claim has been to judicially enforce the sale of the plaintiffs en-
forcement right to the defendant-polluter. 125 In this sense, the
plaintiffs property right to be free of the nuisance is understood as
a negotiable interest, the taking of which must be compensated by
122. Epstein and Sax agree on this point.
123. Professor Alexander criticizes the limited historical foundation for that spe-
cific limitation. See ALEXANDER, supra note 11.
124. See YELLING, supra note 119.
125. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 31 (discussing the possibility of four
rules governing nuisance actions: two "property rules" and two "liability rules." The
chief example exploring these rules is what the state of affairs would be between a
polluting factory owner and a homeowner depending upon the allocation of property
rights).
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the defendant. A nuisance claim is in this sense a transferable en-
titlement to the value of the nuisance-creating behavior. 126
The Clean Air Act was the legislative response to widespread
public nuisance problems, 127 justified in part by the finding that
air pollution constitutes a nuisance in the form of a threat to the
health and welfare of the people.128 As a federal regulatory
scheme, the Clean Air Act has effectively preempted the citizen's
common law right of action against air polluters who are subject
to the Act, and replaced it with the citizen's enforcement action. 29
The enforcement action, therefore, is the citizen's only remedy
against nuisances created by air pollution emitters. This provision
has imported the citizen's common law property right against nui-
sance into the statutory enforcement scheme. Therefore, as to
emissions subject to the Act, whatever remains of the citizen's en-
titlement to be free of air pollution nuisance exists in the right of
enforcement action. However, under current emissions trading
schemes, polluters can effectively avoid potential enforcement ac-
tions by purchasing rights to pollute, not from potential citizen
plaintiffs, but from other polluters. This purchased right to pollute
is the functional equivalent of the plaintiffs common law transfer-
able entitlement to clean air. Instead, emissions trading allows
polluters to profit from the purchase and sale of pollution entitle-
ments. Under current emissions trading standards, a polluter who
buys enough allowances may pollute at levels that would other-
wise violate the Act, and citizens are divested of their traditional
rights of action against such emissions. 130
126. Again, to use the Calabresian heuristic, if the homeowner has the right to be
free from pollution, then the factory owner can pollute only if he compensates the
homeowner. If, however, the factory owner has the right to pollute, the homeowner
can escape the pollution only if he can afford to pay the factory owner to stop polluting
(or to reduce the pollution to an acceptable level: efficient pollution level). In essence,
the initial entitlement is really merely an assignment of a right to a potential stream
of income. See id.
127. I am ignoring for the time being the distinction between public and private
nuisances.
128. One of the current theatres of "federalism" conflict on the Supreme Court
arises from the notion that there is no general federal police power and thus the
power to interfere in the normal workings of the market stems from background com-
mon law principles that both establish and limit governmental regulatory authority.
129. See CAA § 304, 42 U.S.C. 7604 (1994).
130. As the law and economics literature illustrates, there may be good policy rea-
sons for making this trade-off, but the virtue of the policy should not blind us to the
fact that it is a trade-off. See Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and
Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles' Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9
DuKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 231 (1999). See also David Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap
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When the regulatory framework is understood in this way,
current emissions trading functions to diminish, without compen-
sation, the citizen's entitlement to be free of pollution. Whatever
the salutary benefits of such a program may be, they run contrary
to the equitable principles underlying the common law of nui-
sance. It fails to adequately protect the citizenry's legal and equi-
table interests, because it allows a nuisance to lie without
providing a remedy. An important justification for reserving to cit-
izens the right of an enforcement action is that it reserves a por-
tion of the traditional power of injured persons to enforce public
obligations without benefit of the state. To the extent that emis-
sions trading limit the ability to self-protect, that justification is
undermined.
One promise of the skytrust is that it will protect the citizen's
entitlement. By making every citizen a beneficiary of the profits
from each emissions trading transaction, the skytrust will capture
for each citizen a portion of the value of the transfer of the right to
enjoin air pollution. In the context of public trust theory, this
promise is critical to the validity of the underlying transfer. As
Professor Epstein notes:
But why should the grant remain beyond challenge if it is not
revoked? The underlying fear is both familiar and recurrent: the
first legislature has been bought off. If so, then the next legisla-
ture could be bought off as well. To condition challenge to the
grant on its repeal means that in some cases needed challenges
will never take place. Any citizen should have standing to chal-
lenge a major transfer of a public assets.13'
A mechanism like a skytrust would bring the emissions trad-
ing program in line with the equitable principles of nuisance
law- thus better preserving the rights and interests protected by
the preempted common law doctrines-and allow the Act to more
adequately defend the interests of its beneficiaries: private citi-
zens. The following discussion develops the summary just pro-
vided and suggests the legal and theoretical underpinnings for
such an argument.
Fix? The Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 1 (1998).
131. Epstein, supra note 5, at 426 (emphasis added).
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(1) The Nuisance Claim as a Property Right
The concept of the nuisance claim as a property right has ex-
isted in the common law since the late 19th Century.132 However,
the modern revitalization of this principle occurred in 1970.133 In
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,134 the New York Court of Appeals
fashioned a nuisance remedy that recognized a plaintiffs nuisance
claim as a transferable property right. In that case, the plaintiff
sued a neighboring cement plant operator to enjoin the noxious
emission of air pollutants. 135 The trial court found that a nuisance
existed and awarded temporary damages, but denied plaintiff an
injunction.136 Plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, the defendant argued that an injunction was not
proper because it would impose a far greater cost on the owner of
the plant than the nuisance itself imposed on the plaintiff.137 The
New York Court of Appeals disagreed, observing that under New
York nuisance doctrine a finding of nuisance required issuance of
an injunction regardless of the relative hardship of such a remedy
to the defendant. 138 The court recognized, however, that an in-
junction had to be avoided because it would require the plant to
close down at once.139 The court therefore faced the task of replac-
ing an injunctive remedy with money damages while still follow-
ing the principles of nuisance law. The solution of the court was to
grant an injunction unless the defendant paid the plaintiffs per-
manent damages to compensate them for past, present, and future
losses created by the nuisance. 140
Underlying this award was the theory that the defendant was
purchasing a servitude on the plaintiffs land, that is the plant
owner was buying that part of their "use and enjoyment" interests
which defendant's nuisance impaired.' 4 ' This decision reinforced
the view that the plaintiffs nuisance claim is a property right that
the court could force a defendant to purchase from the plaintiff if
132. See Story v. New York Elevated R.R., 90 N.Y. 122 (1882).
133. See Louise A. Halper, Nuisance, Courts and Markets in the New York Court of
Appeal, 1850-1915, 54 ALB. L. REV. 301, 301 (1990).
134. See generally 26 N.Y. 2d 219 (1970). This case is the one that formed the basis
for Calabresi's heuristic in his article. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 31.
135. See Boomer, 26 N.Y.2d at 222.
136. See id at 223.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 224.
139. See id. at 225.
140. See Boomer, 26 N.Y.2d at 226.
141. Id. at 228 (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261, 262, 267 (1947),
to support the "servitude on land" theory of nuisance).
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an injunction was impracticable. Boomer was not the first case to
clearly enunciate this property interest; it had been recognized,
implicitly and explicitly, for much of this century. 142
The Boomer decision has been characterized as the "paradigm
for the modern-day application of nuisance law in environmental
torts."1 43 Boomer and its conceptual predecessors, Story v. New
York Elevated Railroad4 4 and United States v. Causby, 145 support
the general proposition that in awarding either damages or an in-
junction for nuisance, courts allocate the ownership of a property
right: a damages award is the forced sale of an easement from the
plaintiff to the defendant; an injunction is the judicial prohibition
of the defendant's future "trespass" against the plaintiffs intangi-
ble property right in air, quiet enjoyment, light, etc. It follows in
principle that where a cause of action in nuisance exists for air
pollution the complainant holds a defensible property right in be-
ing free from that pollution even where the interest is not con-
nected to a freehold interest in land. The granting of the power to
protect that right is itself an entitlement that the law recognizes
and which may trigger the judicial process of enjoining the pol-
luter's activity, or ordering compensation to the plaintiff for his
lost property interest.
(2) Effects of the Clean Air Act on the Underlying
Nuisance Claim
The discussion of nuisance provides another way to under-
stand and analyze the citizen's entitlement to clean air. The early
discussion of public rights in common property was one side of the
coin. The nuisance doctrine is the remedy that defines the con-
tours of the right, but merely because a remedy does not exist,
142. See Halper, supra note 133. Halper recounts the transformation of New York
nuisance law from strict liability and negligence principles (nuisance as a tort) to
property principles (nuisance as a taking). She sees an early precedent to Boomer in
Story v. New York Elevated R.R., 90 N.Y. 122 (1882), where the court found that own-
ers of property abutting a train line had incorporeal property interests in light, air,
access and quiet enjoyment, in the form of easements that were permanently injured
by the elevated railway. See Halper, supra note 133, at 341. See also Bormann v. Bd.
of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 315-517 (Iowa 1998) (recognizing that for over a cen-
tury, the right to maintain a nuisance is an easement, and holding that the granting
of immunity from a nuisance constitutes a taking from the servient estate that must
be compensated under the Fifth Amendment).
143. H. Marlow Green, Common Law, Property Rights and the Environment: A
Comparative Analysis of Historical Developments in the United States and England
and a Model for the Future, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 541, 556 (1997).
144. See generally 90 N.Y. 122.
145. See generally 328 U.S. 256.
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does not entail the absence of the right. Nuisance law posits that,
generally, courts will protect public and private rights to be free
from pollution that interferes with the use and enjoyment of real
property or which poses a threat to the public's health and wel-
fare. The word "nuisance" is a term of art applicable to a common
law cause of action. "Nuisance" describes the defendant's injuri-
ous activity, and signals the legal conclusion that such activity
has invaded the public welfare of a plaintiffs rights in the use and
enjoyment of his property.
Of course, the common law never recognized air pollution to
be a nuisance per se. The determination of whether certain con-
duct constitutes a nuisance is fact-dependent and case-specific.146
However, under the common law anyone with standing to sue-
anyone who claimed an injury to a recognized interest-had a
right to seek a remedy for nuisance harms inflicted by air pollu-
tion. That right of action could be characterized as a legal entitle-
ment-if not property for all purposes sufficiently property-like
for purposes of vindicating a right in a common resource.
The law of nuisance is divided into two categories: public and
private. The Second Restatement of Torts defines private nui-
sance as "a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the
private use and enjoyment of land."1 47 Public nuisance is one that
"interferes with a communal right and that may lead to civil in-
junction or criminal prosecution." 148 Traditionally, in order to
have standing to press a public nuisance claim, a plaintiff has
been required to show that his injury was different in kind from
that which the general public suffered as a result of the nui-
sance.1 49 Due to its local and regional impacts, air pollution has
the potential to be a private or a public nuisance, depending upon
the injury being asserted and the plaintiffs proximity to the
polluter.150
146. See cases collected in RODGERS, supra note 22, ch. 2.
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1977).
148. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 447 (1996).
149. See Michael Skotnicki, Private Actions for Damages Resulting from an Envi-
ronmental Public Nuisance: Overcoming the Barrier to Standing Posed by the "Special
Injury" Rule, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 591, 595 (1992).
150. Some old cases suggest that the nuisance action was the traditional legal re-
course for defending common property interests. See State v. Black River Phosphate
Co., 13 So. 640. In discussing the rights of commoners to use of riparian waters, the
Florida court drew upon pre-colonial English law:
In Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. 65, it is said that by the common law of England
as it stood long before the settlement of the colony of Massachusetts the
title to the land or property in the soil under the sea, and over which the
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Since 1981, federal courts have recognized that the regulatory
framework of the Clean Air Act has replaced the federal common
law cause of action in nuisance. 151 This recognition followed the
Supreme Court's decision in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and
Michigan, 1-5 2 in which the Court held that the Federal Water Pol-
lution Act Amendments of 1972 displaced the state's federal com-
tide waters ebbed and flowed, including flats on the seashore lying be-
tween high and low water mark, was in the king as the representative of
the sovereign power of the country. But it was held by a rule equally well
settled that this right of property was held by the king in trust for public
uses established by ancient custom or regulated by law, the principal of
which were for fishing and navigation...
The specific nature of the trust in favor of all the subjects of the
realm upon which in England the sovereign held the domain of navigable
waters and shores, and the soil thereunder, was that those subjects
should have the free use of such waters and shores. The waters, though
the domain over and right of property in them were in the crown, were of
common right, public for every subject to navigate upon and fish in with-
out interruption; and, though the right of property in the soil to high-
water mark was likewise in the king, yet the shore was also of common
right public. The use of each was in the subjects for the inherent privi-
leges of passage and navigation and fishing, as public rights, and since
Magna Charta the king has had no power to obstruct navigation or grant
an exclusive privilege of fishing; and the right of the people in this respect
cannot be restrained or counteracted by the sovereign as the legal and
sole proprietor. Any grant of the soil by the king is always subservient, in
the hands of the grantee, to the public right mentioned, and is void in so
far as it conflicts with these rights. In England, the right of property in
navigable waters, as stated above, being in the king, he could abate at his
pleasure every purpresture or encroachment thereon that made several to
the author of it that which ought to be common to all, whether such en-
croachment was a nuisance or not; nor could he license anything that was
a nuisance to such common right. Whether or not a particular encroach-
ment was a nuisance was always a question of fact, and not one merely of
law. Though an erection below high-water mark, or even below low-water
mark, be a purpresture, and abatable at the king's pleasure, it was not
necessarily a nuisance.
Id. at 643-644 (citations omitted).
Note that the encroachment on the common use and enjoyment was deemed a
nuisance, back when the traditional remedy for nuisance was an injunction. The nat-
ural resource was held in trust by the sovereign for the citizens' benefit, and the
means of enforcing the trust was the nuisance action. Now, since Story v. New York
Elevated Railroad and Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., the nuisance action is recog-
nized as a transferable property right.
151. See, e.g., New England Legal Foundation v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir.
1981) (holding that the EPA's approval of the station's sulfur emissions precluded
Appellants from asserting a nuisance complaint), and United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc.,
532 F. Supp. 699, 702 (1982) (finding that, since Congress has addressed the problem
of air pollution in the CAA, the statute pre-empts plaintiffs federal common law claim
of nuisance).
152. See generally 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
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mon law action in nuisance. 153 The Court recognized that
Congress, in enacting the Amendments, intended to supplant the
"often vague and indeterminate nuisance concepts" with a com-
prehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert adminis-
trative agency.154 Two subsequent federal court decisions, New
England Legal Foundation v. Costle155 and United States v. Kin-
Buc, Inc.,156 applied Milwaukee's water pollution precedent to
cases involving air pollution, holding that the Clean Air Act pre-
cluded the plaintiffs cause of action in common law nuisance. Al-
though the appeals court in Costle crafted its holding specifically
to an instance where the EPA had approved the particular defen-
dant's sulfur emissions, 157 its reliance on Milwaukee indicated
that the Clean Air Act might generally pre-empt federal common
law nuisance claims.158 Kin-Buc, decided six months after Costle,
held that the Clean Air Act generally precludes federal common
law nuisance claims. 159
Due to the interstate impact of public utility air pollution, the
federal common law nuisance action was an important mechanism
for adjudicating interstate disputes over harmful emissions. 60 Al-
153. See id. at 317.
154. Id.
155. See generally 666 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1981).
156. See generally 532 F. Supp. 699 (2d Cir. 1982).
157. See Costle, 666 F.2d at 32.
158. In citing its reliance on Milwaukee, the court in Costle stated that:
The Supreme Court held that, by imposing a complex regulatory system
to govern the discharge of effluents into the nation's waters, Congress
precluded the federal courts from fashioning common law remedies to
sanction or abate conduct which had been approved specifically under the
standards set forth in the Water Pollution Control Act.
In the instant case, we need not reach the broad question of whether
the Clean Air Act totally preempts federal common law nuisance actions
based on the emission of chemical pollutants into the air. For even if such
an action might be permitted in some circumstances, the Court's decision
in City of Milwaukee makes it clear that appellants' claims here are
barred on the narrower grounds relied upon by the district court in dis-
missing the complaint as against LILCO.
Costle, 666 F.2d at 32. This language indicates that the limited holding in Costle was
a proper judicial adherence to answering only the questions certified for review. The
court's reliance on Milwaukee, however, supported the prediction that in future cases
the court might reach the broader conclusion of total preemption.
159. See Kin-Buc, 532 F. Supp. at 702.
160. See Andrew J. Heimert, Keeping Pigs Out of Parlors: Using Nuisance Law to
Affect the Location of Pollution, 27 ENvTL. L. 403, 475-492 (1997). Heimert argues
that federal pollution statutes inadequately protect the interests of localities in at-
tacking pollution nuisances. See id. at 491. He notes that the Supreme Court has
found that "the Clean Water Act (and by inference the Clean Air Act) has preempted
both federal nuisance law and the nuisance law of the affected state." Id. at 491-92.
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though by its terms the Clean Air Act preserves remedies availa-
ble at state law, federal common law is arguably more relevant to
the skytrust than state nuisance law. 161 The former applies to the
interstate effects of pollution that tend to affect the rights of citi-
zens regionally thereby invoking national interests. The latter ad-
dresses intrastate pollution problems of more local nature. The
purpose of the skytrust is to compensate citizens for their inter-
ests in the nation's atmosphere. But if the Act, in effect, preempts
local remedies and eliminates any recourse to the limited remedy
arising from federal common law, the devaluation of private rights
of action effectively eliminates an entitlement from the people.
Unless the citizen suit provisions provide an effective substitute,
the Act functions to transfer a public resource to the self-interest
of a limited set of private parties.
Prior to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, the Act did
provide an appropriate remedy in the form of the citizen's enforce-
ment action. Under section 304 of the Act 162 any person may com-
mence a civil action on his own behalf-"against any person ...
Through the federal courts' power of diversity jurisdiction, many state claims brought
in state court against large utility holding companies may be removed to federal
court. See id. at 479.
161. See CAA § 403(f) (regarding the relationship between tradable allowances
under the acid rain program and nuisance law):
Nature of allowances. An allowance allocated under this subchapter is a
limited authorization to emit sulfur dioxide in accordance with the provi-
sions of this subchapter. Such allowance does not constitute a property
right. Nothing in this subchapter or in any other provision of law shall be
construed to limit the authority of the United States to terminate or limit
such authorization. Nothing in this section relating to allowances shall be
construed as affecting the application of, or compliance with, any other
provision of this chapter to an affected unit or source, including the provi-
sions related to applicable National Ambient Air Quality Standards and
State implementation plans.
Id.; see also CAA § 116:
Retention of State authority. Except as otherwise provided in sections
1857c-10(c), (e), and (f) (as in effect before August 7, 1977), 7543,
7545(c)(4), and 7573 of this title (preempting certain State regulation of
moving sources) nothing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right
of any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any
standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any
requirement respecting control or abatement of air pollution; except that
if an emission standard or limitation is in effect under an applicable im-
plementation plan or under section 7411 or section 7412 of this title, such
State or political subdivision may not adopt or enforce any emission stan-
dard or limitation which is less stringent than the standard or limitation
under such plan or section.
Id.
162. See CAA § 304.
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who is alleged to have violated (if there is evidence that the al-
leged violation has been repeated) or to be in violation of (A) an
emission standard or limitation under this Act or (B) an order is-
sued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a stan-
dard or limitation."163 Thus the citizen's right to enjoin air
pollution was preserved under the act consistent with the stan-
dards set in the statute. Any person can bring a suit, and the fed-
eral district courts are empowered to enforce the Act's emission
limitation requirement and order civil penalties.164
Recent limitations on the right to sue under the citizen's suit
provisions should give us some pause. These limitations should
disturb our confidence that the citizen's suit provision was an ac-
ceptable substitute for the effective surrender of a pre-existing en-
titlement. The Supreme Court held that a citizen would not have
standing to bring an enforcement suit unless the violation was oc-
curring at the time of the trial.165 In Steel Company v. Citizens for
a Better Environment, the Court held that past violations of a reg-
ulation do not constitute redressable injuries and therefore do not
create a cause of action. 166 Steel Company limits the citizen's
right of action to those involving current violations thus narrow-
ing the scope of legal entitlement the Act preserves for private citi-
zens. 167 However, the reasoning highlights the citizen suit's
substantive quality as an action seeking remedy for an injury.
Steel Company's insistence on a cognizable injury to the plaintiff
163. Id. § 304(a)(1).
164. See id. § 304(a)(3).
165. See Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
166. See generally id.
167. The Supreme Court effectively rejected this analysis as applied to the Clean
Water Act (CWA). See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 (1999):
Laidlaw contends that the reasoning of our decision in Steel Co. directs
the conclusion that citizen plaintiffs have no standing to seek civil penal-
ties under the Act. We disagree. Steel Co. established that citizen suitors
lack standing to seek civil penalties for violations that have abated by the
time of suit. 523 U.S., at 106-107, 118 S.Ct. 1003. We specifically noted
in that case that there was no allegation in the complaint of any continu-
ing or imminent violation, and that no basis for such an allegation ap-
peared to exist. Id., at 108, 118 S.Ct. 1003; see also Gwaltney, 484 U.S.,
at 59, 108 S.Ct. 376 ("the harm sought to be addressed by the citizen suit
lies in the present or the future, not in the past"). In short, Steel Co. held
that private plaintiffs, unlike the Federal Government, may not sue to
assess penalties for wholly past violations, but our decision in that case
did not reach the issue of standing to seek penalties for violations that are
ongoing at the time of the complaint and that could continue into the fu-
ture if undeterred.
Id. at 187.
270 [Vol. 18
WHO OWNS THE SKY?
delineates the citizen suit's procedural and conceptual origin in
the common-law nuisance claim, and distinguishes it from the citi-
zen's suit cognate of the criminal or administrative proceeding.
The citizen suit has been the functional surrogate for the pre-
empted common law nuisance claim. As against public utilities,
whatever remains of the entitlement to be free of air pollution re-
sides in the citizen suit. Indeed, this right of action provides a
means through which citizens can goad the EPA to vigorous en-
forcement of the Act's anti-pollution standards, and, if agencies
fail to protect the public interest, to provide private enforcement
mechanisms.168 A remnant of the citizen's property right in the
traditional common law nuisance claim appears codified in section
304 of the Act. 169 Thus any serious limitation on the citizen suit
provisions damages both the administrative function and takes
from citizens a right they would otherwise have.
The effects of trading schemes compound the injury that re-
sults from a limitation of the citizen suit provisions. Under the
emissions trading program a utility can legally emit as much pol-
lution as it wants (consistent with other requirements of the Act)
as long as it buys enough allowances to guarantee its pollution
entitlements. This effectively deprives citizens of the ability to en-
join such excessive pollution via the enforcement action, and fails
to compensate them for this divestiture of their property right in
the nuisance action that was functionally replaced by the citizen's
suit provision. Thus, the current emissions trading program effec-
tively transfers the citizen's entitlement to the utility owners, who
in turn trade these entitlements for cash and realize significant
financial benefits. These benefits may or may not be passed on to
the utilities' ratepayers. Professor Epstein counsels us that even if
they are passed on, it is not at all clear that the requirements of
the public trust obligations will have been met.170
168. See Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., Inc., 592 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1979).
169. However, it has been observed that the citizen enforcement action is less-
than-perfectly effective as a defense mechanism. See Heimert, supra note 160, at 427-
28 ("This 'citizen suit' provision was originally intended to allow citizens to spur EPA
into bringing more enforcement actions against violators, but complicated issues
about the feasibility of the Act's requirements have led to far fewer suits than origi-
nally anticipated.").
170. See Epstein, supra note 5.
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(3) A Critique of Emissions Trading Within the
Framework of Law and Economics
To understand how emissions trading diminishes the citizen's
valuable entitlement, it is helpful to look to modern applications of
economics to environmental policy. In a famous article, "The Prob-
lem of Social Cost,"171 economist Ronald Coase argued that legal
rules (such as nuisance) do not merely protect one party from an-
other. Rather, legal rules protect one party at the expense of an-
other. Observing this, Coase concluded that protecting one group's
interest with a legal rule will always take something away from
another group, and will therefore entail a cost that society will
have to pay. 172 In response to the economic inefficiencies of legal
rules, Coase offered an alternative scenario in which parties bar-
gain for the right to engage in, or stop the other from engaging in,
a particular behavior. 173 Through bargaining parties settle on a
mutually favorable price, producing an economically efficient allo-
cation of resources that is better for the parties and for society.
Coase's hypothetical state could only be obtained if the transac-
tion costs of such bargaining were not prohibitive.174 Accordingly,
legal rules should reflect those the parties would bargain for or at
a minimum they should not create obstacles to achieving the eco-
nomically efficient result.175
a. A Standard Efficiency-Based Argument for Trading
People who support emissions trading typically justify their
claims by appealing to the Coase theorem and work that builds on
it. This line of research strongly suggests that using a market-
based approach like emissions trading rather than a command
and control approach can minimize the cost of improving air qual-
ity. It is particularly important for the government to minimize
the cost of reducing pollution under the Clean Air Act and other
environmental policies, because the government has fiduciary du-
ties with respect to both financial and natural resources.
Although emissions trading under the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments (CAAA) has yielded cost savings relative to a command and
171. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 2 (1960).
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. But see Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further,
100 YALE L. J. 1211 (1991). Transaction costs, "no less than existing technology, de-
fine what is currently achievable in any society." Id. at 1212.
175. Of course, Coase was using Pareto criteria for his definition of efficiency.
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control approach, research from the area of public economics indi-
cates that Title IV and other trading schemes that simply give pol-
lution rights to firms impose much higher costs on society than
need be. Contrary to early policy recommendations based on the
Coase theorem, the initial allocation of entitlements affects the po-
tential efficiency gains from trading. This means that the uncom-
pensated transfer of citizens' entitlement to enjoin pollution to
private companies is not only inequitable-it is inefficient as well.
A skytrust mechanism would help correct for both of these
weaknesses.
Coase pointed out that problems involving non-market or ex-
ternal costs like pollution are essentially problems of incompletely
defined property rights.176 This insight led Coase to suggest that
direct regulation or taxes on undesirable activities were not the
only means to address external costs. 177 Instead, an economically
efficient outcome could be reached by defining property rights and
allowing the interested parties to negotiate with one another. 78
Coase emphasized that, as long as transaction costs were low, the
efficient result would be reached regardless of the initial alloca-
tion of the entitlements. 179 Building on this central insight, econo-
mists suggested that air and water pollution could be reduced by
identifying the total level of pollution that should be allowed, and
distributing transferable rights to pollute amounting to the total
allowable level.' 80
As those proposals explained, the potential for emissions trad-
ing to yield cost savings follows from the fact that different firms
face different marginal cost curves for controlling pollution.
Whereas a command and control approach requires the same
abatement activity of every firm regardless of these differences, a
trading scheme exploits the differences and encourages firms to
re-allocate reduction efforts to the sources that have the lowest-
176. See Coase, supra note 171, at 1-44.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. Thomas R. Crocker, The Structuring of Atmospheric Pollution Control Sys-
tems, in THE ECONOMICS OF AIR POLLUTION 61, 80-85 (Harold Wolozin ed., 1966) (dis-
cussing the use of tradable emission rights to control air pollution); see also JOHN H.
DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES 93-97 (1968) (applying the concept of market-
able pollution rights to water quality problems). These proposals were soon strength-
ened by Montgomery's theoretical proof that markets in rights to pollute could be
used to achieve specified levels of environmental quality at least cost. See W. David
Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs, 5 J.
ECON. THEORY 395-418 (1972).
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cost opportunities to reduce pollution. The re-allocation occurs
through market transactions, which are made possible by allocat-
ing to firms a limited quantity of transferable rights to emit a cer-
tain amount of pollution. The scarcity of the rights creates an
incentive for sources with low-cost pollution reduction options to
reduce pollution beyond the amount required by their initial enti-
tlement holdings, down to the point at which the cost to them of
reducing another unit of pollution equals the price that they can
command from other firms for the entitlement to pollute that next
increment. The low-cost firms then sell the excess rights to firms
with higher control costs.
These transactions equalize the marginal cost of pollution re-
duction faced by all firms and thereby minimize the aggregate cost
of reducing pollution to the level set by the total number of emis-
sions allowances. Moreover, if the total allowable level of pollution
is set at the proper level, the marginal cost faced by the firms will
equal the marginal benefit of the avoided pollution damages, and
the trading regime will be efficient as well as cost-minimizing.
Echoing Coase, economists working in this area have tended
to emphasize that the cost-minimizing equilibrium can be
achieved regardless of who receives the pollution rights in the first
place. "Because of this result," one advises, "the management
agency can distribute licenses as it pleases. Considerations of eq-
uity, of administrative convenience, or of political expediency can
determine the allocation."' 81 Subsequent partial equilibrium anal-
ysis' 8 2 has cast some doubt on this strong assertion; 8 3 but that
work generally concludes that economic efficiency concerns justify
giving more attention to how entitlements were allocated among
181. Montgomery, supra note 180, at 409.
182. Partial equilibrium analysis of single markets (or systems of related markets)
rests on the assumption that all relevant variables except price are constant. In other
words, the underlying demand and supply curves are specified in advance. Income
levels of consumers are also specified in advance and remain constant. In general
equilibrium analysis, by contrast, these variables are determined within the model.
183. For example, Robert Stavins shows that if transaction costs are significant,
the initial allocation of permits can influence the amount of trading and the equilib-
rium permit distribution, thereby increasing the total cost of reducing emissions. See
Robert N. Stavins, Transaction Costs and Tradeable Permits, 29 J. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGMT. 133 (1995). Other research indicates that the initial allocation of entitlements
could affect the efficiency of the trading outcome in the presence of market power and
uncertainty about the approval of transactions. See Robert W. Hahn, Market Power
and Transferable Property Rights, 99 Q. J. ECON. 753 (1984); Henry van Egteren &
Marian Weber, Marketable Permits, Market Power, and Cheating, 30 J. ENVTL. ECON.
& MGMT. 161 (1996); Juan-Pablo Montero, Marketable Pollution Permits with Uncer-
tainty and Transaction Costs, 20 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 27 (1998).
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polluters rather than concluding that pollution rights should not
be granted to firms. In the absence of strong economic arguments
to do otherwise, the government has made the politically palat-
able move of giving emissions allowances to firms free of charge.
Even in the absence of strong arguments against giving away
entitlements, it is important to consider how that transfer redis-
tributes wealth. At first it might seem that trading can be equita-
ble as well as cost-effective, since energy costs comprise a
considerable portion of low-income households' spending. For ex-
ample, if the cost savings from emissions trading keep electricity
prices for consumers lower than would be the case under com-
mand and control regulations, those households benefit dispropor-
tionately from the avoided price increases. Yet when entitlements
are given freely to firms, they generally will retain the scarcity
rents that accrue to the pollution rights and pass that amount on
to consumers in the form of higher product prices.' 8 4 However,
this outcome can be avoided if the government captures the rents
through an up-front auction or other means.' 8 5
b. The Efficiency Argument Against Giving Away
Entitlements to Pollute
A very different set of insights has emerged from general
equilibrium analysis, which enables economists to consider the in-
teractions between environmental policies and other aspects of
the economy such as taxes on non-environmental factors of pro-
duction. Of particular relevance to the proposal for a skytrust
mechanism is recent work in public economics on the closely re-
lated topics of the tax interaction effect, revenue recycling, and
the potential for a "double dividend" from environmental taxes or
emissions trading programs. Although the research in this area is
not conclusive, there is. widespread agreement on a core set of
findings that partly support and partly challenge the skytrust pro-
184. Such rent capture by industry can happen-and apparently has happened-
under other types of environmental policies as well. See Michael T. Maloney & Robert
E. McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation, 25 J.L. &
ECON. 99 (1982) (identifying the conditions under which firms can enhance their
wealth by retaining rents created by environmental regulation, and providing empiri-
cal evidence of such value-enhancing rent retention under the OSHA cotton-dust
standards and the prevention of significant deterioration provisions of the CAA).
185. Four alternative instruments for capturing rents-a profit charge, an allow-
ance rental charge, an ad valorem royalty and a lump sum charge-are discussed in
R. Quentin Grafton, Rent Capture in a Rights-Based Fishery, 28 J. ENrL. ECON. &
MGMT. 48 (1995).
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posal. Like the distributional argument above, these findings em-
phasize the importance of capturing the scarcity rents that result
from the establishment of a system of marketable emissions per-
mits for C0 2-as would be accomplished by auctioning off emis-
sions permits in the skytrust program-rather than granting the
entitlement to pollute to firms and leaving the rents in private
hands. Here, however, the argument for rent capture is based on
efficiency concerns. The challenges to a skytrust proposal from
this research concerns the disposition of the revenues obtained
through the auction or some form of transaction tax.
The basic intuition behind this area of research is that envi-
ronmental policies are actually implemented in a second-best
world that includes, for example, economic distortions resulting
from taxes on labor and other factors of production and tax deduc-
tions for certain consumer goods.'8 6 Economic assessments of pol-
icies that have economy-wide impacts-like Title IV or a CO 2
trading program-need to take those distortions into account, be-
cause they will influence the ultimate economic effects of the envi-
ronmental policies. In other words, the partial equilibrium
analysis provides only part of the picture, and the partial view can
yield inaccurate estimates of the costs of environmental policies.
The question of how environmental policies and existing taxes
interact to alter the economic effects of the former is probably best
addressed with an example. In the U.S. and elsewhere, payroll
and other taxes drive a wedge between the price that workers re-
ceive for their efforts and the amount that employers pay. As a
result, less labor is supplied than would be optimal. Given this
context, suppose that the EPA implements a trading program to
limit C0 2 emissions from utilities. Partial equilibrium analysis
would assess only the "primary welfare gain" from the policy,
which is the benefit (the averted environmental damages) less the
costs incurred to reduce the emissions. Considering only this eco-
186. A few helpful overviews of work on interactions between environmental poli-
cies and taxes on factors of production are Ian W.H. Parry & Wallace E. Oates, Policy
Analysis in the Presence of Distorting Taxes, 19 J. PUB. POLICY ANALYSIS & MGMT. 603
(2000) [hereinafter Parry & Oates, Policy Analysis]; Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Met-
calf, Environmental Taxes and the Double-Dividend Hypothesis: Did You Really Ex-
pect Something From Nothing? 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 221 (1998); and Lawrence H.
Goulder, Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend: A Reader's Guide, 2 INT'L
TAX & PuB. FINANCE 157 (1995) [hereinafter Goulder, Envtl. Taxation]. For a discus-
sion of interactions between environmental policies and distortions in consumer mar-
kets, see Ian W.H. Parry & Antonio M. Bento, Tax Deductions, Environmental Policy
and the "Double Dividend" Hypothesis, 39 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 67-96 (2000)
[hereinafter Parry & Bento, Tax Deductions].
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nomic effect, the optimal level of emissions reduction (the level
that would maximize social welfare) would be the Pigouvian level:
the level at which the benefit of reducing one more unit of CO 2
equals the cost of making that incremental reduction.
General equilibrium analysis accounts for two economic ef-
fects in addition to the primary welfare gain.18 7 The first effect-
the "revenue recycling effect"-is a potential source of welfare
gain. This effect will be realized if the emissions trading program
generates revenues and those revenues are used to cut the margi-
nal rate of labor taxes.' 88 Recycling revenues in this way at least
partially corrects for the tax interaction effect, which exacerbated
the wedge between the labor prices faced by employers and em-
ployees. The second is the "tax interaction effect." This effect is
welfare-reducing. It results from two impacts of the trading pro-
gram. First, the program raises the cost of production, which gets
passed on to consumers through higher prices. This in turn
reduces the real wage of workers, which further discourages (al-
ready undersupplied) work. Second, consumers will shift away
from carbon-intensive goods because of their higher prices. This
will erode the demand for emissions allowances, reduce their
value, and thus reduce the revenues that can be reaped for re-
cycling. The further discouragement of work and the erosion of the
environmental revenue base together comprise the tax interaction
effect.
Considering all three economic effects-the primary welfare
gain, the tax interaction effect, and the revenue recycling effect-
can significantly change the estimate of the social cost of a trading
program. Equally important is the fact that by identifying differ-
ent sources of gains and losses, the cost analysis can lead to differ-
187. This explanation draws primarily from Goulder, Envtl. Taxation, supra note
178; and Parry and Oates, Policy Analysis, supra note 186. Most of the literature in
this area focuses on environmental taxes. Auctioned permits are regarded as
equivalent to taxes. Grandfathered permits are regarded as being equivalent to im-
posing an environmental tax under which revenues are returned through lump-sum
payments. Trading and taxes are explicitly compared in Ian W.H. Parry, Environmen-
tal Taxes and Quotas in the Presence of Distorting Taxes in Factor Markets, 19 RE-
SOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 203 (1997).
188. Labor taxes are mentioned here only as an example. See Goulder, Envtl. Taxa-
tion, supra note 186, at 165 (suggesting that the greatest gains will be realized by
targeting revenue recycling toward the type of taxation with the highest marginal
efficiency costs and that targeting taxes on capital might be preferred on that
ground). See also Parry & Bento, Tax Deductions, supra note 186 (pointing out that
recycling revenues to correct for distorting tax deductions can yield considerable wel-
fare gains).
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ent policy recommendations than would follow from analyses that
consider only the primary welfare gain. For example, economists
Goulder, Parry and Butraw find that the total cost of achieving
the 10-million-ton reduction in S0 2 emissions called for in the
1990 CAAA is seventy-one percent (or $907 million) higher when
all three effects are included in the analysis than when only the
primary welfare effect is considered. Yet if emissions allowances
were auctioned rather than grandfathered and the revenues were
used to cut taxes on labor income, more than half of the "extra"
cost could be avoided.18 9
Similarly, Parry, Williams and Goulder find that in the ab-
sence of revenue recycling, the tax interaction effect increases the
cost of a hypothetical U.S. carbon tax or tradable permit program
to such a degree that a positive carbon tax or (or any quantitative
limit on emissions) cannot be justified on grounds of increasing
social welfare unless marginal environmental benefits exceed $25
per ton. However, if tax revenues (or proceeds from a permit auc-
tion) are used to cut income tax rates, a positive tax is justified as
long as environmental benefits are positive. 190 Under all esti-
mates of environmental benefits, these analysts suggest, the opti-
mal tax rate is lower than the marginal environmental damages-
which is the same as saying that it is lower than the Pigouvian tax
rate. 191
In other cases, accounting for all three economic effects can
lead to a much lower estimate of the social cost or even a negative
social cost. In this last case, the environmental policy is said to
yield a "double dividend" and it can be justified as a welfare-in-
creasing measure as long as the environmental benefits are at all
positive. 192 Regardless, the robust finding from the research is
189. See Lawrence H. Goulder et al., Revenue-raising Versus Other Approaches to
Environmental Protection: The Critical Significance of Preexisting Tax Distortions, 28
RAND J. ECON. 708, 721 (1997) [hereinafter Goulder et al., Revenue-raising].
190. See IAN W.H. PARRY ET AL., WHEN CAN CARBON ABATEMENT POLICIES IN-
CREASE WELFARE? THE FUNDAMENTAL ROLE OF DISTORTED FACTOR MARKETS 17 (Nat'l
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 5967, 1997), available at http://pa-
pers.nber.org/papers/W5967.pdf [hereinafter PARRY ET AL., CARBON ABATEMENT]. See
also A. Lans Bovenberg & Lawrence H. Goulder, Optimal Environmental Taxation in
the Presence of Other Taxes: General-Equilibrium Analyses, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 985,
991-92 (1996).
191. See PARRY ET AL., CARBON ABATEMENT, supra note 190, at 17.
192. There are few examples of such a double dividend in the literature, except
where researchers included the revenue recycling effect without accounting for the
tax interaction effect. See Parry & Bento, Tax Deductions, supra note 186 (providing
an example); and Goulder, Envtl. Taxation, supra note 186 (identifying the conditions
under which a double dividend might be expected).
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that trading policies that do not give away pollution rights have a
lower social cost than those that do-at least as long as the reve-
nues are used to address existing economic distortions. Goulder
calls this the weak double dividend hypothesis, and notes that this
argument is "easily defended on theoretical grounds and... re-
ceives strong support from numerical simulations" of actual
economies. 193
Fullerton and Metcalf recast the double dividend hypothesis
in terms of scarcity rents.194 They emphasize that the welfare-re-
ducing interaction between environmental policies and pre-ex-
isting economic distortions arises from the generation of scarcity
rents that remain in private hands. Thus, environmental policies
that do not create scarcity rents (such as a technology mandate
that applies to both existing firms and market entrants) and envi-
ronmental policies that capture all rents (like emissions trading
programs in which pollution rights are auctioned) do not generate
the interaction effect described above.' 95
c. How Should Revenues Captured from Emission
Trading be Distributed?
This brings us to the main challenge that this area of research
poses for the skytrust proposal, namely: the very work that estab-
lishes strong efficiency grounds for capturing the scarcity rents
that accrue to pollution rights casts equally strong doubts on the
notion that returning the auction revenues to citizens through
lump-sum payments is the best way to dispose of the revenues.
Instead, the studies strongly suggest that social welfare will be
greatest if revenues raised from selling off tradable emissions al-
lowances are used to reduce the marginal rates of taxes on labor
or capital, or to correct distortions in consumer markets created
by tax-favored goods.
193. Goulder, Envtl. Taxation, supra note 186, at 175. Goulder's exact statement of
the weak form of the double dividend hypothesis is this: "By using revenues from the
environmental tax to finance reductions in marginal rates of an existing distortionary
tax, one achieves cost savings relative to the case where the tax revenues are re-
turned to taxpayers in lump-sum fashion." Id. at 159.
194. DON FULLERTON & GILBERT METCALF, ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS, SCARCITY
RENTS AND PRE-EXISTING DISTORTIONS (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Pa-
per No. 6091, 1997), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/W6091.pdf.
195. See id. at 39. That this is basically a restatement of the above point about the
importance of revenue recycling can be seen by considering that in most studies, the
revenue recycling effect just offsets the tax interaction effect. However, Fullerton and
Metcalfs account does not seem to explain the instances when a double dividend is
realized.
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This is a strong argument, at least if economic efficiency is the
only perspective that is considered. When the studies discuss "op-
timizing" social welfare, they are defining the term "optimal"
strictly in the sense of efficiency. At least one study suggests that
the results can come out differently when some measure of equity
is factored in to the definition of "optimality." Proost and Van
Regemorter distinguish among income groups and include a term
to reflect society's aversion to inequitable income distributions. 196
They find that, if society is averse to inequality and the lump-sum
payments accrue relatively more to the poor, the equity benefit of
returning environmental tax revenues to citizens through lump-
sum payments can compensate for the efficiency losses from inter-
actions between the environmental policy and a distortionary
tax.197 In other words, the weak double dividend hypothesis and
its emphasis on recycling revenues to reduce the rates of distortio-
nary taxes can fail when equity concerns dominate other
considerations.
d. Emission Trading, Efficiency, and the Equal
Protection Dimension of the Public Trust
Doctrine
As I have just discussed, emissions trading has been charac-
terized as a Coasean attempt to solve the problem of economic
inefficiency that arises under a command and control regulatory
structure like the Clean Air Act. This arrangement has been
deemed inefficient for many reasons, but especially because the
rule does not account for unequal compliance costs will burden
some polluters more than others and thus fails to incorporate
structural efficiencies that might obtain under another system of
pollution reduction. It also produces other kinds of structural in-
equities. If one assumes that utility plants in poorer areas will
pass compliance costs on to their customers, the rule also tends to
place a greater relative burden on less capitalized utility markets,
thus operating like a regressive tax. Consequently, top-down regu-
lation can tends to create negative externalities: higher utility
costs, reduced consumption, and reduced savings in the less afflu-
ent communities which tend to have less efficient and dirtier util-
ity plants. This outcome contributes to the economic problems in
196. See S. Proost & D. Van Regemorter, The Double Dividend and the Role of
Inequality Aversion and Macroeconomic Regimes, 2 INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN. 207 (1995).
197. See id. at 212.
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those areas. In wealthier areas, this outcome is much less
perceptible.
By uniformly spreading the costs of pollution control, com-
mand and control regulation burdens poorer communities while
bestowing a relative windfall upon richer ones. Assuming that pol-
lution control is a universally desired public good, richer commu-
nities pay a much smaller proportion of their wealth for this good
than poorer ones do. Poorer communities receive the good at the
cost of economic security that richer communities do not have to
sacrifice. In this sense, then, the rule actually extracts wealth
(clean air plus what is sacrificed for compliance) from the poorer
communities and gives it to the richer ones.
Emissions trading seems to mitigate the problem of unequal
cost spreading discussed above. Those who are better able to bear
the costs of reducing emissions have an incentive to reduce on be-
half of those who are more burdened by pollution control costs.
Though I have merely sketched out a schematic of the argu-
ment, a few lessons and problems emerge from this analysis. The
first is that an emitter is not only legally obligated to reduce emis-
sions down to the limit specified on its permit; it is also legally
entitled to emit up to that amount. Like many other entitlements,
this one is freely transferable. The other lesson is that, beyond
establishing a system to equitably spread the costs of pollution re-
duction, emission trading creates a market based on the demand
for pollution rights that has the advantage of improving corporate
balance sheets. 198
Emission trading allows parties to bargain around a legal
rule. As I have already indicated, current emission trading signifi-
cantly ignores the justice interests that the uniform requirements
sought to preserve. Emission trading allows polluters to sell pollu-
tion rights to each other. Thus two potential defendants bargain
over the price of an entitlement that may immunize the holder
from an enforcement action. Absent a strong citizen suit provision,
however, members of the public, those the Clean Air Act is meant
to protect, are left out of the bargain. Emission trading protects
the direct financial interests of polluters at the expense of the citi-
zens who could otherwise enjoin excessive emissions. Except
where the government is selling allowances, the public, the real
198. The Phase II emissions trading program is projected to save utilities, nation-
wide, $2.3 billion out of an estimated $3.06 billion cost of compliance. See Five Years
of Interstate S0 2 Allowance Trading: Geographic Patterns and Potential Cost Savings,
ELECTRICITY J., May 18, 1998.
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party in interest, receives none of the profits flowing from the sale
of his or her entitlement. 199 Within the context of the public trust
interest in the sky resource this effect implicates the Constitu-
tional principle requiring just compensation or at minimum due
process for the surrender of an entitlement. To the extent that the
Constitutional foundations for the public trust doctrine rest in the
same justice requirement a trading scheme that fails to account
for the real parties in interest should cause us to look more closely
at the structure of the trades and the identities of those who cap-
ture the value of the trades. Professor Epstein has suggested that
there is an equal protection dimension to the public trust doctrine.
When property is conveyed out of public trust for inadequate
consideration, some citizens receive disproportionate benefits,
while others receive disproportionate losses. The uncompen-
sated transfer of public property to private use thus disadvan-
tages some at the expense of others. Those who have come up
short under the transfer have been denied the equal protection
of the law. 20 0
By vesting market-making responsibility in a mechanism ad-
ministered for the people, and by enabling citizens to capture the
profits from emissions rights transactions, the skytrust compen-
sates them for the diminishment in their entitlement. Therefore,
a skytrust would bring the Clean Air Act's emissions trading sys-
tem in line with principles that underlie the obligation to reduce
pollution. It would also better preserve the value of the citizen's
diminished cause of action against air pollution nuisances; and ar-
guably bring the Act into closer accord with Congress' fiduciary
199. At the onset of the SO 2 allowance program regulators expressed intent to see
that the costs and benefits of emissions trading are equitably distributed. See Indus-
try Faces Key Ratemaking Issue of Cost vs. Market for SO2 Allowances, ELECTRIC UTIL.
WEEK, October 3, 1994. That article stated that a regulators' committee was making
an unprecedented effort to equitably distribute the costs and benefits of compliance
under the Clean Air Act Amendments, and to avoid the anticipated conflicts stem-
ming from variations in different states' laws. However, that effort has not mitigated
the significant conflicts that have arisen. See Industrials Challenge Kentucky Power's
Decision to Retain its Allowance Earnings, INDUSTRIAL ENERGY BULLETIN, January 23,
1998. The Kentucky Power Company has resisted flowing $2 million in earnings from
S0 2 allowance sales back to its customers in the form of lower rates, and its decision
has been contested by the Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers. This scenario is
indicative of the ambiguity that exists in the equitable treatment of emissions trading
proceeds, and illustrates the point that the current emissions trading scheme is inef-
fective in preserving the interests of third party stakeholders in pollution rights
transactions.
200. Epstein, supra note 5, at 428.
WHO OWNS THE SKY?
duty to protect the interests of private citizens. The skytrust
places a price on the right to pollute through the emissions trad-
ing scheme and compensates the public for an interest held by all
citizens and surrendered by all through the imposition of a na-
tional program to reduce emissions.
As I have noted, taking account of these interests would im-
plicate the efficiency gains promised by a trading scheme, but the
research merely requires that we think carefully about how the
value that is captured by the trading scheme is distributed and to
whom. What I have suggested here is that apart from the effi-
ciency goal, there are other, deeper equality principles that are
embedded in the public nature of the interest in the sky resource.
Whatever scheme is adopted, efficiency alone will not be the sole
evaluative criterion unless the determination is made that the
savings, both in social costs measured as a tax and in the social
costs measured as damage to human health and to the environ-
ment, dictates one model over all others.
C. Is the Surrender of a Nuisance Claim a Taking?
A corollary of the equal protection dimension of the public
trust doctrine, and one that directly implicates the economic anal-
ysis, is the suggestion that the government's allocation of profits
from allowance transfers to the exclusion of common asset interest
holders constitutes a taking compensable under the Fifth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. There are a variety of
ways to assess this claim. You need not ultimately find that a
taking has resulted to benefit from the insights such an inquiry
can yield. From the perspective of sound policy, the issue of trans-
ferring a private interest from one person to another in instances
of market failure is almost always permitted. 20 1 The transfer of
public resources to private persons are permitted as well, al-
though they too are subject to the kind of searching inquiry dis-
cussed earlier.20 2 What about the transfer of a common asset that
has occurred without the searching inquiry that would be required
by the due process clause?20 3 The transfer of the sky asset from
the common pool of assets held by all to a small group of private
201. See Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
202. The history of the West is the history of public transfers to private parties.
203. See the discussion of this issue in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526
U.S. 687 (1999). The due process required of public actors when limiting private
rights has never been definitively settled, especially where it implicates other consti-
tutional obligations.
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parties where it is done in a way that prevents the private vindi-
cation of the common right poses a difficult question, but it is one
that has been at least provisionally answered. Remember that
here not only has the pollution loading capacity of the atmosphere
been allocated from some private parties to others, but the legal
capacity to challenge the allocation has in essence been eliminated
as a private right.
The Supreme Court of Iowa faced a version of this question.
In the case of Borman v. Board of Supervisors,20 4 they held that
the Iowa Right to Farm law was unconstitutional and worked a
taking because it insulated some private parties from private nui-
sance actions. While the statute in question did not grant a total
immunity from nuisance suits, it did immunize farmers from suits
by their neighbors arising during normal farm operations. In ana-
lyzing the issue the court concluded that for purposes of compen-
sation, property includes every sort of interest the citizen may
possess.205 Consistent with the reasoning in Boomer, the right to
maintain a nuisance is equivalent to granting an easement to the
defendant. 20 6 Moreover, where the nuisance is maintained by vir-
tue of a grant from the government, the government action is the
real source of the injury and thus is either impermissible or if per-
missible, compensable. According to the court,
[T]he state cannot regulate property so as to insulate the users
from the potential private nuisance claims without providing
just compensation to persons injured by the nuisance. .."[An
act of the legislature cannot confer upon individuals or private
corporations, acting primarily for their own profit, although for
public benefit as well, any right to deprive persons of the ordi-
nary enjoyment of their property, except upon condition that
just compensation be first made to the owners." 20 7
The state may not, according to this court, permit condemnation
by nuisance. One question that bears asking is whether the limi-
tation on private enforcement actions so limits pre-existing rights
as to constitute a deprivation of either due process or property? If
204. See generally 584 N.W. 2d 309 (Iowa 1998), cert. denied, Girres v. Bormann,
525 U.S. 1172 (1999).
205. See id. at 315. It added parenthetically, "[Piroperty is not alone the corporeal
thing, but consists also in certain rights therein created and sanctioned by law, of
which, with respect to land, the principal ones are the rights of use and enjoy-
ment. .. ." Id.
206. See generally id.
207. Id. at 320 (citing Pennsylvania R.R. v. Angel, 7A. 432, 433 (N.J. Eq. 1886)).
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so, the skytrust is one mechanism to begin the redistribution in a
way that directly addresses the transfer of value that is at the
heart of the taking issue. As I have argued elsewhere, since the
transfer of equivalent value is sufficient, creation of a skytrust
both recognizes the interest of the people in the air resource and
gives us a mechanism to give as well as to take.
IV. Conclusion
I have argued that the public has a current and continuing
interest in the air resource. This commonly held interest requires
that where the government has sanctioned the private trading of
this asset the government must account for the profits of such
trades. In short, it is not the government's property to give away.
Ancillary benefits associated with cleaner air do not offset the
public's interest in the value of the resource, especially where the
regulatory scheme has effectively precluded private action in de-
fense of the resource. This does not discount the government's ob-
ligation to protect the resource from predation; it merely suggests
that the government's obligation is not exhausted by that effort.
The government in those moments is acting both as a trustee and
a referee. As a trustee it must protect the basic value of the re-
source. However, when it acts to alienate the resource to the det-
riment of other rightful claimants it has a high burden of
justification that it must meet. While there has been no genera-
lized public trust obligation imposed on the federal government,
the federal government has recognized that it acts in a trustee
capacity towards public resources. Yet this recognition can
scarcely be enough. The limiting principle buried in that trustee
role must arise from independent obligations that ground both
claims to democratic legitimacy and protection of property. The
law surrounding the evolution of the public trust doctrine sug-
gests the contours of those obligations.
In addition to the property roots of the public claim on the air
resource, economic research supports the conclusion that the effi-
ciency gains made by using market mechanisms to reduce pollu-
tion also supports the capture by the government of scarcity rents
created by the allocation of pollution rights. Put another way, the
protection of the property interest of the public that is reduced to
tradable pollution rights makes economic sense, as well as being
justified by our deeply held normative commitments reflected in
property doctrine. Moreover, when the efficiency arguments are
combined with arguments rooted in equity claims, some of the
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benefits of the market mechanisms may be diminished, but other
values like our commitments to equality and democratic legiti-
macy may be strengthened. We have looked at the sky as though
it were a common resource free of any substantial public interest
other than the protection of its quality. Yet by taking this narrow
view we have permitted the government to transfer a substantial
public resource to private hands free of charge. It is this failure
that I have been arguing against.
